<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE article  PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v3.0 20080202//EN" "http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/3.0/journalpublishing3.dtd"><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="3.0" xml:lang="en" article-type="research article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">OJAcct</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Open Journal of Accounting</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2169-3404</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Scientific Research Publishing</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.4236/ojacct.2016.54008</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">OJAcct-71114</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="Discipline-v2"><subject>Business&amp;Economics</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>
 
 
  Chairman Characteristics and Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
 
</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Jiacai</surname><given-names>Xiong</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"><sub>1</sub></xref><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"><sup>*</sup></xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><label>1</label><addr-line>School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, China</addr-line></aff><author-notes><corresp id="cor1">* E-mail:<email>xiongjc-p@163.com</email></corresp></author-notes><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>26</day><month>09</month><year>2016</year></pub-date><volume>05</volume><issue>04</issue><fpage>82</fpage><lpage>94</lpage><history><date date-type="received"><day>September</day>	<month>5,</month>	<year>2016</year></date><date date-type="rev-recd"><day>Accepted:</day>	<month>October</month>	<year>7,</year>	</date><date date-type="accepted"><day>October</day>	<month>10,</month>	<year>2016</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement>&#169; Copyright  2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. </copyright-statement><copyright-year>2014</copyright-year><license><license-p>This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</license-p></license></permissions><abstract><p>
 
 
  Using a large sample of Chinese listed companies during period from 2005 to 2014, this paper investigates whether the managerial characteristics of Chairman affect earnings management. Using McNichols [1] accrual-based and Roychowdhury [2] real earning management, we find that companies with female, long-tenured, older and more educated Chairman have lower absolute discretionary accruals and lower real earnings management after controlling other factors that prior research has shown to be associated with earnings management. The results suggest that Chinese listed companies can improve earning quality by appointing more female, experienced, and educated chairmen, as well as increasing the tenure of Chairman.
 
</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>Earning Management</kwd><kwd> Gender</kwd><kwd> Tenure</kwd><kwd> Age</kwd><kwd> Education</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body><sec id="s1"><title>1. Introduction</title><p>In this paper, we investigate whether the characteristics of Chairman of the board affect earnings management based on a large sample of Chinese listed companies.</p><p>Accounting information is of importance to firm’s decision making, debt contract and corporate governance. Therefore, the accounting quality has attracted attention of investors, creditors and scholars. For China, although it has experienced incredible levels of growth, structural change and other factors that have enhanced its transformation, it is a critical issue for Chinese stock market regulators to increase earnings quality and thus enhance market efficiency [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref3">3</xref>] .</p><p>Earning quality has received lots of attention. However, those researches keep keen concern on company characteristics, financial structure and external efforts in supervising and so on (Please refer to the review papers [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref2">2</xref>] [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref4">4</xref>] ). It is often ignored that the characteristics of top managers have significant influences on financial strategy and resource allocation.</p><p>Since Hambrick and Mason proposed upper echelons in 1984, top managers’ characteristics have become the research object of academic. Under Chinese corporate law, the Chairman is the legal representative of the company; therefore, this person is endowed with the highest level of authority in the firm and bears the overall responsibility for firm operation. In most cases, the Chairman is also the highest paid employee. For these reasons, some studies regard the position of Chairman as the top management post in a firm [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref5">5</xref>] .</p><p>Therefore, this study aims to provide empirical evidence and shed light on the relationship between characteristics of Chairman and earnings management by using a sample of Chinese firms that were publicly listed between 2005 and 2014. We find that companies with female, long-tenured, older and more educated Chairman have lower absolute discretionary accruals and lower real earnings management after controlling other factors that prior research has shown to be associated with earnings management.</p><p>The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design, models, variable measures, and sample. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on whether Chairman’s characteristics affect earnings management. Section 5 concludes the study.</p></sec><sec id="s2"><title>2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development</title><p>Hambrick and Mason [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref6">6</xref>] originally proposed upper echelons theory. It researches the company group of senior executives. The basic idea is the cognitive base and value, and these qualities will affect the manager's actions and decisions, thereby affecting the company’s performance and organizational competitive behavior. Since the cognitive bases, values, and perception of upper level managers are inconvenient to measure, Hambrick and Mason [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref6">6</xref>] use observable managerial characteristics as indicators of impact and behaviors. In the paper, we choose gender, age, education and tenure that are the most represented factors to investigate whether those factors affect earnings management.</p><p>1) Gender</p><p>The female executives literature suggests that women tend to be less aggressive or more cautions in financial decision. For example, Riley and Chow [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref7">7</xref>] find that women are more risk averse than mean when making investment choices. Peng et al. [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref8">8</xref>] show that male managers are more apt to exhibit overconfidence in investment decisions when compared with female managers.</p><p>With regards to corporate governance, Adams and Ferreira [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref9">9</xref>] use a US firm’s sample and find that female directors have better attendance records than male director. In addition, gender-diverse boards allocated more effector to monitoring and CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance in these firms.</p><p>In summary, prior research suggests that females are more caution and more likely to improve corporate governance. This lead to the argument that female Chairman are less likely to be aggressive in making judgments related to discretionary accruals and to have higher accruals quality.</p><p>Therefore, we formally state the hypothesis as follows:</p><p>H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with female Chairman will exhibit lower earnings ma- nagement.</p><p>2) Tenure</p><p>Tenure of managers is another notable considerable factor in characteristic of senior management. Tenure affects cognitive foundation, prompt executives to make a different strategic choice, and eventually affect organizational performance. Tenure of senior managers has an effect on communication between the team and other executives. The longer the time to work jointly is, the better mutual understanding and communication between senior managers is. There will be fewer conflicts within the top management team. Organizational performance will be significantly improved [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref10">10</xref>] . If senior managers work in the company longer, they can more deeply understand the organization's policies and procedures. And organizational experience as an indicator variable, tenure also represents the level of familiarity with a common language in the internal organization [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref11">11</xref>] . The awareness of organization's resources and identification capability for external environment is positively correlated to tenure of managers.</p><p>Wiersema and Bantel [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref12">12</xref>] found that average tenure of bankrupt enterprises is shorter that the successful companies, which leads to lack of mutual understanding and information gathering time, finally giving rise to the mistakes of strategic decision- making. Thus, I hypothesize the following</p><p>H2: Ceteris paribus, firms with longer tenure Chairman will exhibit lower ear- nings management in China.</p><p>3) Age</p><p>Executives with different age show variety in the risk tendency and behaviors, which affects firm strategy and performance. An older Chairman tends to choose conservative strategy and becomes risk-averse tendency. Meanwhile, the older Chairman has lower passion and involvement to work, and is willing to live a peace condition. Therefore, decision-making tend to be steady [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref6">6</xref>] [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref13">13</xref>] . Prendergast and Stole1 [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref13">13</xref>] believe that in order to show their abilities, the young managers likely to exhibit over-confidence in corporate decision-making, meanwhile the greater possibility of manipulating earnings.</p><p>Moreover, the older Chairman has higher reputation compared with younger, so is not willing to exaggerate the earnings by earnings management. The older Chairman thinks risk things such as earnings management would affect their reputation. As well as, the older Chairman attaches more attention to risk management and promotes more stringent standards of control activity, then represses earnings management. He and Liu [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref14">14</xref>] show that the age of executives is negatively related to financial restatements.</p><p>Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:</p><p>H3: Ceteris paribus, firms with older Chairman will exhibit lower earnings ma- nagement.</p><p>4) Education</p><p>To some extent, the individual’s education level reflects their knowledge and skills. Thus, education can affect their values and decision-making of senior management by improving the cognitive education and skills.</p><p>It is believed that Chairman with relatively high education has a wider range of knowledge and more systematized knowledge system, and is thoughtful dealing with problems [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref6">6</xref>] . Furthermore, prior research finds that level of education is positively related to individual’s cognitive complexity, receptivity to innovation and information processing capabilities [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref15">15</xref>] .</p><p>Earnings management is comparatively more professional and higher risk activity. Chairman with higher level of education can efficiently acquire related accounting knowledge. As a result, he can analyze related information fully, see pattern of earnings management, understand the serious consequences of earnings management, and is keenly aware potential risk. He can prevent the behavior of earning management to occur. Therefore, we propose the hypothesis:</p><p>H4: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher education Chairman will exhibit lower earnings management.</p></sec><sec id="s3"><title>3. Research Design</title><sec id="s3_1"><title>3.1. Sample Selection</title><p>This paper uses Chinese listed companies during 2005 and 2014 as analysis sample. Sample firms are listed on the boards of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. We exclude financial firms because their liabilities are not strictly comparable to those in other industries. The financial and accounting information data are extracted from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database commercially available from Shenzhen GTA Information Co. Ltd. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorize each continuous variable at the first and 99th percentiles.</p></sec><sec id="s3_2"><title>3.2. Variable Definition</title><p>The variables needed in the empirical analysis are variables reflected earnings management, variables reflected characteristics of Chairman and control variables. Related definition about variables as follow:</p><sec id="s3_2_1"><title>3.2.1. Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management</title><p>We use a cross-sectional model of accruals proposed by McNichols [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref1">1</xref>] to estimate discretionary accruals. She combines the Jones [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref16">16</xref>] and Dechow and Dichev [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref17">17</xref>] models, and uses the following model to estimate discretionary accruals.</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula79"><label>(1)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x2.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where:</p><p>TA<sub>it</sub> = total accruals for firm i in year t, measured as the difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows (TA<sub>it</sub> = NI<sub>it</sub> − CFO<sub>it</sub>).</p><p>A<sub>it</sub> = total assets for firm i in year t.</p><p>CFO<sub>it</sub> = cash flow from operations for firm i in year t.</p><p>REV<sub>it</sub> = change in revenues for firm i from year t − 1 to year t.</p><p>PPE<sub>it</sub> = firm i’s gross property plant and equipment in year t.</p><p>ε<sub>it</sub> = error term.</p><p>We estimate Equation (1) separately for each one-digit industry-year group (manufacturing industry is based on two-digit), using all observation for which required data are available on CSMAR database. We also require that each group has at least ten observations. The residuals of these regressions are used as measures of discretionary accruals, which denoted as DA.</p></sec><sec id="s3_2_2"><title>3.2.2 Measuring Real Earnings Management</title><p>Following Roychowdhury [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref2">2</xref>] and Cohen and Zarowin [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref18">18</xref>] , we construct three mea- sures of real earnings management. Concretely, we estimate abnormal production costs using the following Equations:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula80"><label>(2)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x3.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where i and t separately denotes firm and year, PROD is the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventory from year t-1 to yeat t. A is the firm’s total assets. SALE is the firm’s sales turnover.</p><p>We estimate abnormal discretionary expense from the following model:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula81"><label>(3)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x4.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where EXPENSE is the sum of selling expense and administrative expenses.</p><p>Finally, we estimate abnormal operating cash flow using the following model:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula82"><label>(4)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x5.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where CFO is the operating cash flows.</p><p>Following Cohen and Zarowin [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref18">18</xref>] , we combine the above three indicators to capture the overall effects of real earning management using the following Equations:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula83"><label>(5)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x6.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>EM_PROD, EM_CFO and EM_EXPENSE are the residuals of equations (2), (3) and (4). A higher value of REM suggests more real earnings management. We perform the regress for each industry-year group which has at least 10 observations.</p></sec><sec id="s3_2_3"><title>3.2.3. Chairman Characteristics</title><p>According to Hypothesis development, in the paper, we define four explanatory variables, which are female Chairman (Female), Chairman’s age (AGE), Chairman’s tenure (Tenure), Chairman’s education (EDU).</p></sec><sec id="s3_2_4"><title>3.2.4. Control Variables</title><p>We analyze and test the relationship of explanatory variables and explained variables through multiple-regression. For avoiding the error of reject the null hypothesis and ensuring the validity and reliability of regression result, it is necessary to choose some control variables to control complicated factors.</p><p>Following Ye et al. [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref3">3</xref>] and Ali and Zhang [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref19">19</xref>] , we controlled firm size, financial leverage, profitability, firm age, asset tangibility, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership and government control dummy. In addition, we also control industry and year fixed effects. See table 1 for definition of variables.</p></sec></sec>
<sec id="s3_3"><title>3.3. Regression Model</title>
<p>We use the following regression model to test the hypothesis H1 to H4. The control variables in these models are based on prior literature (e.g., [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref3">3</xref>] [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref18">18</xref>] [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref19">19</xref>] ).</p><disp-formula id="scirp.71114-formula84"><label>(6)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="http://html.scirp.org/file/2-2670091x7.png"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>We estimate Equation (2) using ordinary lest squares (OLS). Following Peterson [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.71114-ref20">20</xref>] , we adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation using cluster at the firm level.</p></sec></sec></body>
<back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="scirp.71114-ref1"><label>1</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">McNichols, M.F. (2002) Discussion of the Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. Accounting Review, 77, 61-69.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.61</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref2"><label>2</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Roychowdhury, S. (2006) Earnings Management through real Activities Manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42, 335-370. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref3"><label>3</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Ye, K.T., Zhang, R. and Rezaee, Z. (2010) Does Top Executive Gender Diversity Affect Earnings Quality? A Large Sample Analysis of Chinese Listed Firms. Advances in Accounting, 26, 47-54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2010.02.008</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref4"><label>4</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Dechow, P.M., Ge, W.L. and Schrand, C. (2010) Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 344-401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref5"><label>5</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Firth, M., Fung, P.M.Y. and Rui, O.M. (2006) Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy. Journal of Management Studies, 43, 1289-1330. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00621.x</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref6"><label>6</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P.A. (1984) Upper Echelons: Organization as a Reflection of Its Managers. Academy Management Review, 9, 193-206.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref7"><label>7</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Riley, W.B. and Chow, K.V. (1992) Asset Allocation and Individual Risk Aversion. Financial Analysts Journal, 48, 32-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/faj.v48.n6.32</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref8"><label>8</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Peng, W.Q. and Wei, K.C.J. (2007) Women Executives and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the S&amp;P 1500.Working Paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref9"><label>9</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Adams, R. and Ferreira, D. (2009) Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291-309. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref10"><label>10</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Katz, R. (1982) The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27, 548-570. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2392547</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref11"><label>11</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Zenger, T. and Lawrence, B. (1989) Organizational Demography: The Differential Effects of Age and Tenure on Communication. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 353-376. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256366</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref12"><label>12</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Wiersema, M.F. and Bantel, K.A. (1992) Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change. Academy of Management Journal, 35, 91-121.   
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256474</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref13"><label>13</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Prendergast, C. and Stole1, L. (1996) Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning. Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1105-1134. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262055</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref14"><label>14</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">He, W.F. and Liu, Q.L. (2010) A Study on the Relationship between the Characteristics of the Background of the Top Managers of China’s Listed Companies and Their Behavior of Financial Restatement. Management World, No. 7, 144-155. (In Chinese)</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref15"><label>15</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Kimberly, J. and Evanisko, M. (1981) Organizational Innovation: The Influence of Individual, Organizational, and Contextual Factors on Hospital Adoption of Technological and Administrative Innovations. Academy of Management Journal, 24, 689-713. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256170</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref16"><label>16</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Jones, J. (1991) Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193-228. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2491047</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref17"><label>17</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Dechow, P.M. and Dichev, I. (2002) The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. Accounting Review, 77, 35-59. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref18"><label>18</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Cohen, D.A. and Zarowin, P. (2010) Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 2-19. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.01.002</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref19"><label>19</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Ali, A. and Zhang, W.N. (2015) CEO Tenure and Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 59, 60-79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.004</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.71114-ref20"><label>20</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Petersen, M. (2009) Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 435-480. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn053</mixed-citation></ref></ref-list></back></article>