Impacts of Using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National Security at Isebania Trans-Border, Migori County, Kenya

National Security of any nation is the epitome of development and prosperity. The term evolved from simpler definitions that emphasized freedom from military threat and from political coercion. A nation has security when it has the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory, to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms, to preserve its nature, institutions and governance against disruption from outside; and control its borders. The study examined the impacts of using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National security at Isebania trans-border, Migori County, Kenya. The study employed Decision Theory. Survey design was utilized which involved collection of data on a number of variables. Target population comprised of 980 persons (800 business persons, 70 village elders, 60 border Officers, 43 Police Officers, 6 Chiefs and 1 Assistant county commissioner (ACCs). The study considered a 30% of each category of sample population and therefore, the sample size for the study was 294 (240 business men and women, 21 village elders, 18 border officers, 12 police officers and 2 chiefs, 1 ACC). Interviews, Questionnaires, and Focus group discussion tools were used to collect data from the respondents. Data was analyzed by use of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 27. The result was presented in form of graphs. Findings revealed that Multi-Agency Command Centre as a strategy views border security with a bird’s eye view, as used by Foucault where in our case multi-agency command center as both security planning and a coordination tool where all the relevant leaders in an emergency gather under one chair to plan, execute and pool resources and harness synergies as evidenced by this research as the public view it. This does not mean that the tool is ineffective by virtue of the fact that the public is not knowledgeable, but its ineffectiveness is demonstrated by evidence that National Intelligence Service does not detect and curb crime. Therefore, the study recommends that training needs to be enhanced more, especially on trust leaders about Multi-Agency Command Centre and competencies instilled on how to lead and better harness the synergies of all participating agencies as per their specialization. There is dire need to deploy more intelligence personnel at the borders to improve effectiveness of securing our borders.

• Boundary
• Border
• National Security

1. Introduction

Border has been called the fundamental political institution; and the bordering process is one of the most important roles for community, delineating between inside and outside, us and them, safe and dangerous, known and unknown [1] . The interplay of surveillance and mobility has a long history, growing from historical fears of invasion, disease, and mass migration. However, the sinews of empire and the current network society of globalization depend on the free mobility of at least some portion of the global population. Indeed, as Foucault foresaw, one might say that “the idea of the Panopticon is completely archaic,” reliant as it is on “an exhaustive surveillance” For space to open up, for circulation to take place, “we see the emergence of a completely different problem” that is not about strict demarcating but “allowing circulations to take place, controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement” [2] .

At the same time, inter-state borders remain central to the global mobility regime, both in terms of the “international management of populations” Hindess [3] , but also the management of labor flows. References to border security and border insecurity not only shape discourse about the border, but also about immigration, drug policy, U.S.-Mexico relations and homeland security. Border regulation and control have effectively been upgraded to a national security mission. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), agency that oversees the Border Patrol, states that its “top priority is to keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States”

While many illegal entry attempts take place at official ports of entry (POEs), others take place in the long and sometimes remote stretches of border in between POEs. In these areas, the Border Patrol uses patrols and sensor technology to detect illegal entry attempts [4] . Due to limitations in resources and the difficulty in making precise estimates about the total flow of illegal activity that is undetected, it is not always possible to assess how successful the patrolling strategies are, since apprehension data alone does not provide a complete picture. In the Kenyan setting especially at Isebania, the problem of drugs, cattle rustling, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons is rampant and therefore, this led the researcher to investigate the trans-border surveillance strategies in use and their influence on national security.

In security, domains like border patrolling, adversaries like transnational criminal organizations are constantly using surveillance to gather intelligence about security operations to adapt their actions to avoid detection and interdiction.

If security operations, such as patrols, are too predictable, it makes adversaries easy to learn patterns in the security operations that can be exploited. Using randomization can be an effective way to improve the efficiency of security policies, and game-theoretic models can be used to identify the right ways to randomize for a specific problem based on predicting the adversaries’ responses to security policies [5] . The smart border is a diffuse one physically extending both beyond and inside its geopolitical location, and involving a multiplicity of sites for the surveillance of movement. Nonetheless, in the uncertain processes leading to their implementation “strategies produce effects, some of them unintended, yet always concrete” [6] .

A systematic review on the potential hurdles to Multi-agency interoperability in the United Kingdom emergency services highlighted the paradox between the joint desires to foster more horizontal and joint working practices whilst maintaining a vertical integrated emergency management system across operational, tactical and strategic levels [7] . Since September 11, 2001, generating a comprehensive response has proven difficult in many countries. However, multilateral approaches have been developed in counter terrorism [8] . For example, the United Nations, the world’s foremost multilateral body, has made strides in developing legal and normative means to combat terrorism, yet member states’ perceptions of the threat of terrorism remain uneven. Measures taken outside the United Nations; The Proliferation Security Initiative, The Financial Action Task Force, and others provide encouraging frameworks, but many are non-binding and voluntary [8] . Onkware et al. [9] in their article “Counter-Terrorism strategies by Kenya against Somalia Terrorism” states that:

“Counter-terrorism should be done with the aim of protecting the lives of Kenyans. The government should appropriately equip the counter-terrorism unit to ensure better intelligence gathering and analysis with respect to counter-terrorism. All Kenya entry points should be computerized to monitor visitors who may feature on global watch lists on organised crime like terrorism. Where terrorists believe either that the cause of terror is worth the consequences that they may face, or that the rewards are much more than the punishment available, then clearly criminal deterrence is not enough”.

On the same breath, Security-based diplomacy is a broad and varying concept that has been understood and implemented in numerous ways, available studies highlight the general hence In Africa, and emerging security threats to nation-states of Africa have become a source of problem for most governments in the continent. Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational terrorism that feeds into the so-called terrorist loop in Africa. A number of terrorist groups are present, most notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that have engaged in suicide bombings, money laundering, smuggling, kidnappings and drug and human trafficking as well as other illicit activities across the neighboring borders of Mali, Chad, Libya, and Niger and Mauritania. As a matter of fact, the rapid growth of entwined transnational criminal networks operating between North Africa and the Sahel is now threatening the security stability in the region [10] .

Odhiambo et al. [11] in their article “The Reprisal Attacks by Al-Shabaab against Kenya” states that:

“A more comprehensive and integrated approach involving political and social actors, relevant national stakeholders, as well as regional and international players is a better strategy to adopt. Kenya needs to understand that the elimination of Al-Shabaab from Somalia is not going to mean the end of the threat of terrorism within its own borders. The stability and development of Somalia will help create an environment where both Kenya and Somalia can co-exist peacefully as neighbors, resulting in more peaceful relations in the region”

Yet, there is a big gap of research to examine the impacts of using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National security at Isebania trans-border in Kenya hence the need for this study.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

Studies that have been done on border issues focused on terrorism and surveillance strategies. For example, Nduti & Odhiambo [12] in their article “Mechanisms of Curbing Smuggling of Food Commodities from Uganda into Busia Town, Kenya” found that: there was heavy security deployment on both sides of the countries. This was one way of discouraging illegal interactions and that interactions had to be promoted through legal activities.

In Wakhungu et al. [13] in their article “Challenges and Opportunities Constraining and Enhancing Kenya and Tanzania Participation in the EAC Econo-Political Integration Process” quote Article 5 (1 and 2) of the Treaty establishing EAC, EAC Treaty [14] states the objectives of the Community. The point to note is the economic theme that runs through the overall objective: The objectives of the Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit (5, 1). In pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Partner States undertake to establish among themselves and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in order to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall be equitably shared (5, 2). There is scanty research on identifying specific trans-border surveillance strategies and interrogating them, or especially in Kenya-Tanzanian at Isebania border. Isebania as a frontier near Tanzania has many challenges from cattle rustling along and across the border, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and the menace of drugs to black economy. This study thus endeavor and examined the impacts of using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National security at Isebania trans-border, Migori County, Kenya in the effort to give suggestion on whether the strategies are relevant and their effectiveness in countering insecurity or the contrary.

1.2. Objective of the Study

Examine the impacts of using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National security at Isebania trans-border, Migori County, Kenya.

1.3. Research Question

What were the impacts of using Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy on National Security at Isebania trans-border, Migori County, Kenya?

1.4. Justification of the Study

1.4.1. Academic Justification

Studies have been carried out on border surveillance strategies to mitigate national security threats in US-Mexico, Russia-Finnish, Spanish-North African lime borders and illegal migration problems, but little has been researched on border surveillance strategies in China, Africa and especially East Africa. Secondly, there have been problems of illegal drugs trafficking, illegal aliens into the country, black economy thrive in Isebania borderlands and small arms and light weapons evidenced by cattle rustling by armed criminals in Kuria West, Kuria East and Trans-Mara communities. This study was interested in examining the extent to which this problem could be solved by scaling up trans-border surveillance strategies in Isebania to keep the nation of Kenya safe. Third, this study once in the libraries will be a reference point for students at both graduate and post graduate studies and hence its necessity.

1.4.2. Policy Justification

The role of border security and territorial integrity is that of military and foreign affairs departments. In Migori County where Isebania is located, the nearest military base is found in Eldoret. The paper therefore finds a gap in that it foresees the need to recommend establishment of a military base in Migori County especially near Isebania to support police and other departments to mitigate border insecurity that could become a national security threat. The study also envisaged to examine whether the image recognition technology, customs manifest, and how multi-agency command Centre has influenced on national security and if these surveillance strategies are insufficient, to be strengthened to keep the country safe.

Security is a sensitive issue and the findings of this study will help in understanding the importance of employing the right security strategies on the borders. Many boundaries of this country are porous and the findings will help know the imminent risk of not effectively guarding the borders. This study therefore will provide valuable information to the government leadership on the extent to which the issue of security could be dealt with effectively. This will help them look for contingent measure to mitigate the lapses in national security at the border of Isebania.

2. Literature Review

Literature review was founded on the premise that knowledge is cumulative. This meant that the researchers established what was already known in an area and then attempted to build on it. The assumption was that existing knowledge was accurately and properly documented and easily retrievable [15] . The depth and breadth of the reviewed literature emphasized the credibility of the research as a scholarly piece of work but more critically, provided a solid background for the investigation.

2.1. Multi-Agency Command Centre and National Security

Multi-agency Coordination Systems (MACS) are a part of the United States standardized Incident Command System. MACS provide the basic architecture for facilitating the allocation of resources, incident prioritization, coordination and integration of multiple agencies for large-scale incidents and emergencies [16] .

In Britain, Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) states that United aims to increase joint working among the three blue lights services. Interoperability is defined as “The extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine, it is based on the assumption that increased interoperability facilitates more effective emergency response”. In addition, the Pollock report, which surveyed 32 major incidents that occurred in the UK over the past three decades, identified how failures ineffective interoperable and multi-agency coordination led to serious delays in responding.

Pollock recommended that improvements in four organisational areas may overcome these effects, which were: 1) cohesive doctrine and organisation; 2) better operational communications; 3) shared situational awareness; and 4) increased joint training and exercising [7] . The JESIP initiative launched alongside training that was provided to all three blue lights agencies that sought to improve five areas where joint standards and operating procedures could facilitate response: a) co-location on scene; b) communication of timely, relevant and clear information; c) co-ordination by integrating response; d) joint understanding of risk; and e) focussing on establishing a shared situational awareness of the evolving incident [17] .

The JESIP doctrine holds that fluid coordination and response to emergencies will be achieved through training that emphasises the use of “acronym-free” communications and the use of the “Joint Decision Making Model” (JDM) to facilitate shared situational awareness and risk perception (Figure 1). The purpose of JDM is to facilitate joint working, by encouraging all agencies to progress through a shared model of information on a ring, risk and strategy assessment, powers and policy consideration, identification of options and contingencies, and action execution; all while continually and iteratively considering how this interacts with shared goals to work together, save lives and reduce harm.

It is important to acknowledge that increased interoperability may be appealing in theory, but it does not necessarily mean that it will improve decision making in practice. A systematic review on the potential hurdles to interoperability in the United Kingdom emergency services highlighted the paradox

between the joint desires to foster more horizontal and joint working practices and concurrently maintaining a vertical integrated emergency management system across operational, tactical and strategic levels [18] . In other words, all three agencies continue to use hierarchical within-agency command structures whilst paradoxically increasing pressure to make joint and collective decisions between-agencies. This contradictory command structure has proved ineffective in other organizations such as healthcare due to the inconsistency between normal working practices, which use vertical hierarchical structures, and the novelty of using less practiced horizontal coordinated systems [19] . Furthermore, complete interoperability, whereby all information is shared and interdependent, during a major incident response is unrealistic due to time and cognitive constraints in extreme environments [20] . As the need for fast action may supersede the time it would take to share information.

In some instances, they are under the direction of separate command posts and without a true integration of rescue and mitigation tactics and strategy. Emergency operations in New York City serve as one example of how various agencies, each with homeland security responsibilities and operating at various levels of government, still view the achievement of goals in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery from the view point o f a single agency. It is a systemic problem that serves to undermine the current efforts of sharing information among various agencies from the federal, state, and local levels government, in areas such as fusion centers, the development of Interoperable communication capabilities, and multi-agency, inter-jurisdictional disaster training, prevention, planning, response, and recovery efforts [21] .

In contrast to standard emergency responses, such as structural fires or routine criminal investigations, homeland security threats, whether they are terrorist, man-made, or natural disasters, are representative of complex adaptive systems in which the nation’s first responders must operate. In the article, “Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective in Complex Adaptive Systems,” the authors state, “In such systems, relationships are not primarily defined hierarchically, as they are in bureaucratic systems, but rather by interactions among heterogeneous agents and across network agents” [22] .

In addition, specific agencies, particularly those that have a mission of coordination of public safety resources, such as the New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM), may be in the position to fulfill the role of a “meta-leader” by assisting in the development of these trusted relationships to enhance interagency collaboration and interoperability. In the article “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” Author Comfort points out “that in crises incidents, which require an intergovernmental response, there is a need for coordinated action among many agencies that allow access to valid information, and the ability to engage in information search, exchange, absorption, and adaptation” [23] .

This is the essence of a complex adaptive system that, according to the author, evolves with the expanding situation and responds to demands from the crises environment, as well as pressure and support from other organizations. For example, at a radiological “dirty bomb” incident, there are individual agency missions that must be accomplished in order to respond to, mitigate, and recover from the incident. Search and rescue, personnel decontamination, and medical care would be performed by the fire department and the emergency medical services [24] .

Team decision making effectiveness is reduced when there is a poor understanding of distributed roles and responsibilities across the team network; a lack of knowledge about one another’s roles can induce erroneous expectations about other team members’ capabilities and responsibilities to perform certain tasks [25] . This impedes the effectiveness due to the following: one, the assumptions that other team members are responsible, and secondly, competition between team members who may try and contend for dominance or primacy over the decision task [26] . A lack of awareness on one’s own and other’s place in the multi-team system can degrade team decision making in extreme environments by adding to uncertainty. The valence of interpersonal relationships and trust in multi-team settings can also influence the experience of uncertainty in extreme environments. Trust is the shared assumption by two individuals or organizations that the advice provided by another is reliable (Rotter, 1980). Trust can improve decision making in high-risk settings by enabling faster decisions and actions [27] . Trust in team settings is beneficial as it encourages positive self-regulation practices and commitment to collective goals.

2.2. Customs Manifest and National Security

A customs manifest is a document listing the cargo, Passengers, and crew of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, for the use of customs and other officials. Where such a list is limited to identifying passengers, it is a passenger manifest or passenger list; conversely, such a list limited to identifying cargo is a cargo manifest or cargo list. Cargo manifest is like a passport except it is used for goods instead of persons, the manifest is evidence of nationality, no contraband, or property belonging to belligerents, is laden on board of the vessel. Vessels are under no legal obligation to carry a manifest; and, indeed, it is only necessary for neutral vessels, in a time of war.

A cargo manifest and a bill of lading may carry similar information and the concepts are not always clearly distinguished. In some cases, a single document may serve both purposes. In general, a bill of lading serves as a legal instrument focusing on and documenting such issues as ownership, whereas a cargo manifest often more concerned with physical aspects of cargo, such as weight and size.

The world as we know it is now a global village. Countries tend to carry out transactions with each other and this leads to the global concept of international trade which has to do with the exchange of goods or services along international borderssince they can stifle the movement of goods, services and people across borders [28] . Customs clearance implies a responsibility for activities that are largely determined and undertaken by customs officers. There are different roles of customs in different countries but the core function of customs administration is common for all states. There are four main areas that are covered ubiquitously: revenue collection, regulatory compliance, trade facilitation and security [29] . Revenue collection takes the central part of customs responsibility and highly depends on the customs’ duties share of the country. Level of revenue collection depends on the value of the duties of the country’s budget. Customs authorities, thus concentrating their efforts on ensuring that the goods imported into the territory in a procedure or trade agreement are entitled to benefit from reduced or zero duty rates. Loss of income is always a risk area for the customs. Customs ensures the enforcement of customs laws and regulations. Non-compliance with these rules is a risk for the customs authorities [30] . Facilitating trade is also an important role of customs. Global infrastructure gives traders a huge choice of routes for the movement of goods between countries and the most efficient way will be always chosen by traders.

Moreover, Truel holds that, it is cost-effective and safe to move cargo through the longer route to avoid a border crossing. Also, there is a possibility of differences in treatment between customs in the same country. Usually, traders adapt quickly by changing their supply route. Another challenge for customs is to secure the global supply chain. Level of importance of security depends on country but, security remains a source of risk for all customs authorities Customs clearance consists of export and import procedures. Export is a process when goods that are in free circulation within EU are taken to countries outside the EU. Frequently goods are exported permanently without any intention to import them back into the EU [31] . Our interest here was to examine the effectiveness of customs manifest as a surveillance strategy in curbing insecurity at Isebania.

Australia operates its offshore border through a computerized information network called Advance Passenger Processing (APP). Salter discusses the delocalization of the border function through visas [32] . Australia enforces a system of universal visa coverage, supported by highly developed information technologies and comprehensive surveillance. The system enables information exchange, passenger monitoring and administrative processing to commence from the time an intending passenger applies for a visa or attempts to board a flight for Australia. The preemptive mentality which underlies this approach is clear from this extract from an immigration department report: “Australia manages the movement of non-citizens across its border by, in effect, pushing the border offshore. This means that checking and screening starts well before a person reaches our physical border”. Advanced Passenger Information (API) systems in countries of transit, through so-called “pathfinder” projects endorsed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group are operational. By 2004, API Feasibility Studies was conducted in South Korea, Chile and Taipei, with more studies planned, for example, in the People’s Republic of China [33] .

The same report cited capacity building exercises in over 20 Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern countries covering border management assessments; system design and implementation; establishment of document examination laboratories, including the creation of an Identity Checking Unit in Afghanistan; assistance with legal drafting; provision of equipment and training in detection of document fraud, assistance with immigration intelligence, and English language training. Coupled with the placement of Australian immigration officials at key points of transit to Australia, the Australian government has therefore created a formidable offshore network, which operates to sort, immobilize and preempt unwanted arrivals at the physical border [33] .

The process of social sorting inherent in Advance Passenger Processing is evident not only in the profiles applied within the system, but in the initial distinction between electronic and paper applications. Sorting therefore commences from the time of application to travel, long before presentation at an international port. Intending travelers from “suspect” nationalities are subjected to greater scrutiny by Australian visa processing officials and have their photograph kept on file. Those from nationalities, whose “suspect status” with respect to non-compliance with border controls is routinely assumed, are likely to have their visa refused. It is particularly true of nationalities, which account for a significant proportion of onshore asylum applications, even though unlawful arrival in order to lodge an asylum application is permissible under international refugee conventions. Taylor has observed that “as a result of DIMIA’s ‘risk management’ techniques, potential asylum seekers are less and less likely to be granted visas for travel to Australia as evidenced by the downward trend in the proportion of visitor visa entrants making protection visa applications over the past few years” [34] .

The Advance Passenger Processing (APP) system is supported by an extensive network of Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) who work closely with commercial airline employees to screen passengers during check-in and boarding. Since Australian immigration officials have no statutory powers in the interstitial spaces of international airports, it is an airline employee who technically makes the decision about whether to allow a passenger to board. However, these decisions are based on a directive generated by the APP system that it is “OK to Board” or “Not OK to Board,” so that social sorting in compliance with Australian border control policies is generally achieved. Final checking of authorization to enter is conducted by Australian Customs officials at the physical border. However, long before a traveler arrives at the border, an EMR (expected movement record) will have been generated to ensure that “Australian border agencies are aware of the expected travel to Australia of all persons and can tailor their response accordingly” [33] .

Preemption of unauthorized arrival is also facilitated by the Movement Alert List (MAL). The MAL system is a computer database storing details of individuals and travel documents that are believed to be of “immigration concern.” MAL alerts may be based purely on previous immigration history, or may relate to intelligence information fed into the system by security services, visa issuing authorities abroad, or the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The AFP’s Promise system and the PACE and PAES (Passenger Analysis and Evaluation System) databases managed by the Australian Customs Service, are linked in various combinations by a series of Memoranda of Understanding [35] .

Submission of this manifest information to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection is a necessary component of the nation’s continuing program of ensuring aviation and vessel safety and protecting national security. The required information also will assist in the efficient inspection and control of passengers and crew members and thus will facilitate the effective enforcement of the customs, immigration, and transportation security laws.

In summary, Advance Passenger Information (API) is a technique that has the capability of bringing substantial advantages to all involved in the movement of passengers. The World Customs Office (WCO), International Air Travel Association (IATA) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) fully support the effectiveness of API data exchange processes, where adopted in accordance with these guidelines. The cost-effective and efficient use of API depends on a common agreement by all concerned, Carriers and Border Control Agencies, to adopt and implement harmonized data standards, formats and transmission processes. To facilitate this objective, through the efficient use of API data received from carriers and the close co-operation and coordinated strategy between multiple agencies concerned, API can be the catalyst for increased contact between these agencies and the development of common programs which can be of benefit from the perspectives of compliance, facilitation and security. Agreement on a joint national passenger processing strategy, in which API plays a central role, is of critical importance [36] .

2.3. Theoretical Framework

According to Wasike and Odhiambo [37] “everyone uses theories, whether they know it or not. One cannot analyze data without resorting to causal explanations. But theories often lack the specificity needed to make and implement decisions. As a result, policy-makers are often dismissive of the value of theories. No single theory captures the complexity of contemporary world politics. Theories of international relations seek to explain what states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it. Theories have several components. They diagnose, predict, prescribe and evaluate. Nevertheless, Smith [38] believes that not all theories predict nor simply explain. They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention. They define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons. For example, the theory of international relations maintains that war was partly the result of international anarchy and partly the result of misunderstandings, miscalculations and recklessness on the part of politicians who had lost control of event”.

2.4. Decision Theory and National Security

Blaise Pascal, introduced decision theory in his famous “wager” [39] . His argument was designed to convince non-believers that they will be better off becoming believers, Pascal introduced several basic notions of decision theory: 1) the decision matrix, in which one’s acts are independent of Nature’s choices, or the “states of the world”; 2) domination between acts, where one act is better than another no matter which state obtains; 3) expected utility maximization, according to which the choice between un- dominated acts should be according to the mathematical expectation of the utility of the outcomes they yield; 4) subjective probability over the states, which is an application of the mathematical probability model as a way to capture one’s beliefs; and 5) non-unique probabilities, where one’s beliefs are too vague to be captured by a single probability vector.

Decision theory is attractive in security technology-selection problems because it provides a methodology to deal with the uncertainty and multi-objective nature of these decisions. In decision theory, risky decisions are those whose consequences are uncertain. Risky decisions can also have multiple objectives. Each objective has an attribute that is the degree to which a given decision objective has been attained [40] . The security technologies selection problem is the task of selecting the best set of security counter-measures for an information system. Inherently, the challenge is to quantify the benefits of security countermeasures and the consequences or outcomes of successful attacks. The benefit of a security countermeasure depends on how well it stops an attack, or mitigates the consequences of a successful attack [41] . A security engineer must also balance multiple objectives when selecting security technologies. Consequences of successful attacks must be balanced with performance constraints, budget limitations and other design considerations. Each attack may result in a similar outcome, but with different attributes. The security technology-selection method relies on countermeasure expertise to improve the selection of countermeasures. Countermeasure expertise is used to more accurately represent the mitigation impact of a countermeasure given an attack in the security technology selection problem [40] .

Decision theory, however, has been challenged and one of the earliest, and perhaps the most radical objections to the theory was raised by Herbert [42] . He coined the term “bounded rationality”, and argued that people do not optimize; rather, they “satisfice”: as long as their performance is above a certain “aspiration level”, they stick to their previous choice. Only when their performance is below that threshold do they experiment with other choices. Simon thus challenged the very paradigm of optimization. While his theory is relatively seldom incorporated into formal decision models, it has had a remarkable impact on the thinking of many decision theorists, who developed models that are classified as “bounded rationality” even if their departure from the basic paradigm is much less dramatic than that of satisficing behavior. Expected utility maximization was also attacked based on concrete examples in which it turned out to provide a poor prediction of people’s choices.

Importantly, Kahneman and Tversky [43] also uncovered several implicit assumptions of the decision theory, which were also too idealized to describe actual choices. For example, they documented the “framing effect” which shows that different representations of the same problem may result in different choices. Later, in 1979, the two scholars suggested “Prospect Theory” as an alternative to expected utility maximization. One key idea in Prospect Theory is that people respond to given probabilities in a way that is non-linear in the probability, especially near the extreme values of 0 and 1. Another idea, with potentially far-reaching implications to research in political science, is that people react differently to gains as compared to losses.

Decision theory offers guidance for national security policy and associated civil liberty issues introduced by the events On September 11, 2001, when 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group al Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. Two of the planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Almost 3000 people were killed during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which triggered major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism globally. Signal Detection Theory as posited and rekindled by Harvey [44] the state-of-the art procedure for decision making considered here, provides a powerful model for detecting the presence of a “signal,” whether a sensory stimulus in the laboratory, a bomb, or a terrorist. Although the underlying mathematical model is complex, predictions from the model are straight forward and were explored in a few of the many possible security-related applications. Figure 2 shows the theoretical framework model.

3. Research Methodology

This section was organized to reveal the various procedures and their appropriateness that was used in the Study. It gave clear explanation on the Research Design, Location of the study, Target Population, Sample size and Sample procedures, data Collection instruments and Data Analysis.

3.1. Research Design

Survey research was used to answer questions that were raised, to solve problems that have been posed or observed, to assess needs and set goals, to determine whether or not specific objectives have been met, to establish baselines against which future comparisons can be made, to analyze trends across time, and generally, to describe what exists, in what amount, and in what context [45] .

Kraemer [46] identified three distinguishing characteristics of survey research. First, survey research is used to quantitatively describe specific aspects of a given population. These aspects often involve examining the relationships among variables. Second, the data required for survey research are collected from people and are, therefore, subjective. Finally, survey research uses a selected portion of the population from which the findings can later be generalized back to the population.

3.2. Study Location

The study was carried out at Isebania Trans-border in Migori, Kenya. The County is one of the forty seven counties in Kenya. It is situated in the south-western part of Kenya. It borders Homa Bay County to the north, Kisii and Narok counties to the east and Republic of Tanzania to the south. It also borders Lake Victoria to the west. The county is located between Latitude 0˚24' south and 0˚40' south and Longitude 34˚ East and 34˚50' East and covers an area of 2596.5 km² including approximately 478 km² of water surface. Figure 3 shows Map of study area.

3.3. Target Population

According to KNBS, Population Projection by County, Migori Office [47] , Migori County has a population of 1.116 million people. The study therefore targets the 31,931 People in Isebania division in addition, According to Migori County HR Department (2018) there are 60 Officers working at Isebania border post, 43 Police Officers, 6 Chiefs and 1 Assistant County Commissioner (ACC) in Isebania division. The study also targets 70 village elders, and 800 business men and women. The target population therefore comprise of 800 business men and women, 70 village elders, 43 Police Officers, 60 Officers, 6 Chiefs and 1 ACCs).

According to Kricjce and Morgan [48] the sample population for the 294 people was 194, the researcher was able to derive this by considering 30% of sample population according to Mugenda and Mugenda [49] which had a total of 294, then triangulated it according to Cohan and Manion [50] by use of

Krecjcie and Morgan sampling square.

3.4. Data Collection Instruments

The Data collection instruments were; Interview schedules, Questionnaires and group discussions which was conducted by assembling a group of village elders together and then discuss on the topic of security and the Questionnaires to understand their views and opinions of the community members concerning the study because many of them were busy and did not find enough time to go through the Questionnaires and fill them and return them on time [51] .

3.5. Data Analysis

Data was analyzed by use of both descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics included frequencies, percentages and means. Inferential statistic used involved the Chi-Square and correlation analysis to test the relationship between responses from the respondents and the variables under study. Analyzed data was presented in tables, charts and bar graphs as deemed appropriate [15] .

4. Results and Discussion

This section presents the analysed data and the discussion of the same according to the research objective.

4.1. Multi Agency Command Centre, Customs Manifest and Image Recognition Technology Existence at Isebania Trans-Boarder

The officials at Isebania trans-border were engaged in focused group discussions to find out whether there existed Multi Agency Command Centre Strategy, Customs Manifest as Strategy and Image Recognition Technology.

4.2. Awareness of Existence of Multi-Agency Command Centre

The study asked respondents to state whether they were aware of the existence of Multi-Agency Command Centre at the border and out of the 12 in FGD, 11 of them said that:

“Multi Agency Command Centre as a strategy, Customs Manifest as a strategy and Image Recognition Technology as a strategy are fully in existence at Isebania Trans-border and are fully functional. Cameras are installed and are functional and in good condition always. Our intelligence service at the border is a serious component and is used to assist in reducing and curbing crime. Our area chiefs are trusted officers even though there are very few who may indulge in unlawful activities and collude with people with ill motives. Once noticed we deal with it in accordance with law. We have trusted security agencies at Isebania trans-border” (11^th April, 2019, Isebania, Kenya).

The analysis results are as presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4 shows that strongly disagree was 84.0%, moderately disagree 10.8%, strongly agree 3.6%, while agree was 1.5%. Multi-agency command center is a security strategy and or policy that was adopted in Kenya in the year (2015). At the time of conducting this research, little was known about the same except in the security circles. The effectiveness of MACC is not foolproof and has found hiccups in jurisdictions where had been fully embraced like UK and US. Scholars; Lichtenstein et al. [22] , held that in such “systems, relationships are not primarily defined hierarchically as they are in bureaucratic systems but rather by interactions among heterogeneous agents across networks”. Although in our case, we employed Decision Theory while in their case (above Scholars) utilized Complexity Leadership Theory, both gravitates towards making decision in an emergency or hostile environment where massive personnel, resources and expertise has to be assembled, employed within a short period of time and results needed immediately.

This is corroborated by Juma & Odhiambo [52] in their article: Geo-Political factors Influencing Kenya and Tanzania Foreign Policy Behaviour Since 1967.

“The south-south in this case Kenya and Tanzania cooperation can be traced back to the historic Asian-African Conference, or the Bandung Conference, held in Indonesia on April 18-24, 1955, to promote political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and equality.”

4.3. Multi-Agency Command Centre More of a Planning Tool than Surveillance Strategy

On whether respondents viewed multi-agency command centre more of a planning tool than surveillance Strategy analyzed data is presented by Figure 5.

Most of the respondents disagree that multi-agency command is more of a planning tool than surveillance strategy as represented by [43.81%], strongly disagree at 43.30% and lastly strongly agree at 12.89%.

5. Summary and Conclusion

On whether respondents were aware of the existence of multi-agency command Centre at the Isebania trans-border, results shows that strongly disagree was 84.0%, moderately disagree 10.8%, strongly agree 3.6%, while agree was 1.5%. On weather multi-agency command centre is same as national security committees, results displays that strongly agree was 72.2% while disagree was 27.8%. Concerning multi-agency command centre more of a planning tool than surveillance strategy, results demonstrate that disagree was 43.8%, strongly disagree

was 43.3% while strongly agree was 12.9%.

Multi-Agency Command Centre as a strategy views border security with a bird’s eye view, as used by Foucault where in our case multi-agency command centre as both security planning and a coordination tool where all the relevant leaders in an emergency gather under one chair to plan, execute and pool resources and harness synergies as evidenced by this research as the public view it. This does not mean that the tool is ineffective by virtue of the fact that the public is not knowledgeable, but its ineffectiveness is demonstrated by evidence that National Intelligence Service does not detect and curb crime.

Secondly, of concern are that majority of chiefs as security officers collude with criminals and or aliens to allow illicit goods into and out of our country at the Isebania border. Third, trust leaders need more training so as effectively lead the security team at the border.

This corroborated by Odhiambo et al. [53] in their article titled “Kenya Constitution, Child Trafficking as Security Threat.” They said that:

“Cases of child trafficking across the Kenya-Tanzania border are rife. ‘It is difficult to identify traffickers as some pose as owners of orphanages and homes for the destitute. Some pass through the border claiming the children belong to their relatives.’ Some of the female victims end up working in discreet brothels in Kuria, Migori and Transmara districts as well as Isebania border”.

6. Recommendation of the Study

As a measure to improve on security, trans-border surveillance strategies on national security at Isebania, Migori County, Kenya the study projected the following recommendations;

Training needs to been enhanced more, especially on trust leaders about Multi-Agency Command Centre and competencies instilled on how to lead and better harness the synergies of all participating agencies as per their specialization. There is dire need to deploy more intelligence personnel at the borders to improve effectiveness of securing our borders.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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