

Ascertaining Ghana's Dominant Cultural Dimensions Using the Globe Cultural Framework and Examining Its Relationship with the Identifiable Traits of Corruption

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Abstract

This study explores the intersection between national culture and corruption in Ghana by applying the GLOBE cultural framework to examine how dominant cultural dimensions influence perceptions of corrupt practices. In this study, corruption perception is conceptualized as the socially and culturally shaped understanding of what constitutes corruption, including how individuals interpret, evaluate, and morally judge actions such as bribery, nepotism, and abuse of public office. This goes beyond measuring perceived prevalence or tolerance, focusing instead on how corruption is defined within a given cultural context. Drawing on a sequential mixed-methods approach, the research first identified core corruption traits through qualitative inquiry and then validated them quantitatively within a large sample of public-sector workers (N = 632). The qualitative findings revealed that Ghanaians conceptualize corruption as the misuse of public office for personal or familial gain, with bribery, nepotism, and abuse of power emerging as recurring themes. These insights informed the construction of a culturally grounded corruption scale comprising five dimensions: public betrayal-based, inducement-based, abuse-of-power-based, public rule violation-based, and unethical secrecy-based corruption. Quantitative analysis using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) demonstrated that Ghana's cultural profile is most strongly characterized by future orientation and in-group collectivism. The results further showed that cultural dimensions significantly shape corruption perception. In-group collectivism and power distance were positively linked to greater acceptance of favoritism and nepotism, while performance orientation was inversely related to corruption perception. The findings confirm that corruption in Ghana

is not only a governance issue but also a culturally embedded and socially constructed phenomenon.

Keywords

Corruption, Culture, GLOBE Framework, Ghana

1. Introduction

Background of the Study

Corruption is widely recognized as a critical global challenge that has attracted increasing attention from leaders, international organizations, and scholars. It is deeply intertwined with cultural factors; the values, norms, and practices of a society shape how corruption is understood, tolerated, or opposed (Achim, 2016; Fellenberg, Hauser, Brors, Neutzner, Hoheisel, & Vingron, 2001). In different parts of the world, similar actions may be seen as normal social behavior in one culture and condemned as corruption in another (Agbele, 2011; Fenton, 2004). The cultural underpinnings of corruption influence its prevalence, manifestation, and the acceptance of anti-corruption measures.

In Africa, the problem is especially acute. Many African countries consistently rank among the world's most corrupt, and corruption has spread "like an epidemic" throughout public and private institutions in the region (Allwood, 2012; Andersson, 2017). Historical and structural factors (particularly colonial legacies) have entrenched corrupt systems and fostered the abuse of public power (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Fürstenberg, Starystach, & Uhl, 2023). Scholars have thus examined how distinctive African social systems shape corruption dynamics. Studies highlight how customary practices such as elaborate gift giving, extended family obligations, and patronage systems blur the line between cultural tradition and corrupt favoritism (Ankamah & Manzoor E Khoda, 2018). What is considered an act of reciprocity (like giving gifts to elders or officials) may, under certain circumstances, function as a bribe. Likewise, kinship networks and tribal ties often channel resources preferentially, leading to nepotism and biased allocation of opportunities (Antwi-Bediako, 2018). Traditional authorities may also abuse their positions for personal gain, undermining local governance (Apata, 2019).

Despite these insights, the literature on culture and corruption in Africa remains limited. Many analyses focus narrowly on individual countries or rely on qualitative anecdotes, making generalization difficult. There is also a tendency to emphasize the negative aspects of culture (how it facilitates corruption) while overlooking how cultural strengths might promote integrity (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017).

Ghana, a diverse West African nation, exemplifies these dynamics. From the colonial era to the present, the country has battled endemic corruption despite repeated reforms. For instance, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was established in

1993 to investigate and prosecute major financial crimes, and subsequent governments declared “zero tolerance” for corruption. Even so, survey rankings and public perceptions continue to show that corruption remains pervasive (Asomah, 2020). Studies in Ghana document widespread forms of corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, procurement fraud, and “ghost” workers on payrolls (Ayee, 2016; Galtung, 1998).

Cultural traditions are deeply woven into Ghanaian social life and shape perceptions of corruption. Major ethnic groups such as the Akan and Dagbani emphasize communal solidarity, loyalty, and respect for elders. These values foster strong social networks that, while enhancing cohesion, may encourage favoritism and nepotism. Rituals of gift exchange are central to Ghanaian culture but can overlap with acts of bribery when directed at public officials. Moreover, traditional leaders and informal justice systems coexist with formal institutions, creating parallel structures that can both sustain cohesion and open channels for favoritism (Baig, Yenigun, & Alam, 2022; Mbaku, 2008).

Ultimately, corruption in Ghana is a complex and culturally embedded phenomenon. Understanding it requires exploring how cultural norms, traditional authority, and social obligations shape what Ghanaians perceive as corrupt behavior.

This study conceptualizes corruption perception not simply as an assessment of how widespread corruption is, but as a socially and culturally constructed understanding of what constitutes corruption in the first place. Corruption perception refers to the ways individuals and groups interpret, define, and morally evaluate behaviors involving public authority, personal benefit, and the circumvention of formal rules. These interpretations are deeply embedded in social norms, cultural expectations, and shared moral frameworks (Baig, Yenigun, & Alam, 2022; Mawuko-Yevugah & Attipoe, 2021).

This study conceptualizes corruption perception not merely as an assessment of how widespread corruption is, nor solely as the degree to which individuals tolerate corrupt practices. Rather, it is understood as a socially and culturally constructed interpretation of what constitutes corruption in the first place. Specifically, corruption perception refers to the ways in which individuals define, interpret, and morally evaluate actions involving public authority, personal gain, and the circumvention of formal rules. These interpretations are shaped by cultural norms, social expectations, and shared moral frameworks, which determine whether particular behaviours—such as gift-giving, favouritism, or informal exchanges—are perceived as acceptable social practices or as corrupt acts. By adopting this perspective, the study shifts attention from measuring the prevalence of corruption to understanding its meaning within a specific cultural context. This distinction is important because behaviours considered corrupt in one cultural setting may be interpreted differently in another. As such, examining corruption perception through a culturally grounded lens provides a more nuanced understanding of how corruption is constructed, justified, or contested within Ghanaian society.

2. Statement of the Problem

Despite ongoing reforms, corruption remains deeply entrenched in Ghana and across the world. Globally, over two-thirds of nations score below 50 on Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (TI, 2022). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2020) estimates that corruption drains US\$2.6 trillion annually from the global economy, with African countries alone losing between US\$50 billion and US\$89 billion per year. Such losses threaten human rights, political stability, and sustainable development (Anderson, Kelley, & Maxwell, 2017; Liu, Juang, & Yu, 2023).

In Ghana, corruption pervades public institutions such as the judiciary, customs, and revenue agencies, often through bribery, over-invoicing, and misappropriation. Repeated scandals have provoked public outrage but little systemic change (Arndt, 2008; Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). Many anti-corruption frameworks in Ghana and Africa replicate models from developed nations, emphasizing enforcement or governance deficiencies while neglecting underlying cultural and social drivers.

Research indicates that social expectations rooted in extended family systems and communal networks can pressure public servants to engage in nepotism or solicit gifts (Artello & Albanese, 2022; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). Yet most of these studies rely on secondary data, limited samples, or focus on specific ethnic groups, thus failing to capture regional variations or citizens' own definitions of corruption. Consequently, the question of what Ghanaians actually perceive as corruption remains underexplored.

Furthermore, commonly used instruments such as TI's CPI and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) prioritize cross-country comparability and expert perceptions. These tools, largely developed in Western contexts, may not reflect local realities in developing economies. For instance, local practices like small gifts to teachers or community leaders, considered normal cultural expressions in Ghana, may be labeled as corruption in these standardized metrics.

The cultural frameworks often used to analyze corruption, such as Hofstede's (1980) dimensions or the GLOBE, also face criticism for generalizing Africa as a homogeneous cultural cluster and for lacking empirical validation in Ghana. Hofstede's model, for instance, was developed from data limited to IBM employees in the 1970s and has been found inadequate for explaining African socio-cultural realities (Johnston, 1996; Kratcoski & Edelbacher, 2018b).

This gap underscores the need for a context-specific, culturally grounded investigation into what constitutes corruption in Ghana. By re-examining corruption through Ghanaian cultural dimensions, this study seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of corruption's meaning and measurement, and to develop frameworks that align with local values and realities rather than imported models.

2.1. Objective of the Study

The goal of the study is to identify Ghana's dominant cultural dimensions and examine how these cultural traits shape citizens' perceptions of corruption.

- To identify the dominant cultural dimensions of Ghana using the GLOBE cultural framework.
- To examine the influence of key Ghanaian cultural dimensions on citizens' perceptions of corruption.
- To determine how demographic factors—particularly age—moderate the relationship between cultural dimensions and corruption perception.
- To assess whether political activity moderates the effect of cultural dimensions on perceptions of corruption in Ghana.

2.2. Significance of the Study

This study makes important theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions to the understanding of corruption within cultural contexts.

First, it advances a novel, culturally grounded approach that moves beyond standardized perception indices such as those of Transparency International. By focusing on how corruption is locally understood, justified, and contested within Ghanaian social norms, the study exposes the limitations of universal indices that overlook internal cultural variations.

Second, it offers a theoretical contribution by developing a culturally informed framework that explains how values such as collectivism, power distance, and family obligations shape the persistence and normalization of corruption. This framework enriches ongoing debates on whether corruption is merely a legal-economic problem or also a culturally negotiated practice.

Third, methodologically, the study applies the GLOBE cultural dimensions framework to the Ghanaian context—where it has not been previously tested—to provide empirically grounded and context-specific cultural indicators. This strengthens analytical rigor and facilitates future comparative research in similar socio-cultural environments.

Finally, the study has strong practical implications. It provides policymakers, civil society, and development partners with context-sensitive insights to design anti-corruption strategies aligned with local cultural realities. In doing so, it supports the formulation of culturally responsive and sustainable governance interventions to reduce corruption in Ghana and comparable settings.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Corruption and Culture

Corruption is notoriously difficult to define in a single, universal way. Different disciplines (legal, political, and economic) have framed it differently, and no single definition has gained global consensus (Johnston, 2005; Kratcoski & Edelbacher, 2018a). One widely used characterization, offered by Johnston (2018), is that cor-

ruption occurs when public interests are subordinated to private aims in violation of duty or ethical norms, accompanied by secrecy, betrayal, or deception. This conceptualization emphasizes that corruption involves an abuse of trust or power, not merely illicit gain, and that it entails a breach of a community's expected standards (Jong-Sung & Khagram, 2005). In other words, corruption is not just theft of public funds; it is a deeper moral transgression against the social contract. This broader view also covers a range of behaviors (from petty bribery to grand embezzlement) and recognizes that the ethical violation, rather than the monetary value, defines the offense (Transparency International, 2022).

Culture, by contrast, refers to the shared meanings, beliefs, and practices of a group. It encompasses the acquired knowledge and patterns of behavior transmitted from one generation to the next (Malito, 2014) and the symbolic systems that allow individuals to interpret experiences. Hofstede (2001) described culture as the "collective programming of the mind" that distinguishes members of one group from another, while Addai and Pokimica (2010) in the GLOBE Project defined it as the shared motives, values, and beliefs transmitted across generations. Culture shapes how people perceive authority, reciprocity, and moral duty, which are dimensions central to understanding how corruption is viewed within a society. In Ghana, cultural norms such as respect for elders, extended family obligations, and communal solidarity (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Kramer, 2007) influence what people consider acceptable or corrupt conduct.

3.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Culture and Corruption

Academic theories offer different lenses for analyzing how culture and corruption interact. Cultural Relativity Theory (CRT), rooted in anthropology, posits that ethical judgments are culturally contingent (Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008). Thus, what one society labels as "corruption" may be accepted as normal reciprocity in another. Scholars emphasize that practices such as gift-giving and favoritism may be culturally embedded obligations rather than moral failures. For instance, Basu (2021) demonstrated that perceptions of nepotism or gift exchange vary widely across regions due to local moral codes.

Social Network Theory, grounded in sociology, emphasizes that behavior is shaped by interpersonal ties and network obligations (Baumann, 2017; Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019). Within this view, corruption arises within relational networks where reciprocity and loyalty govern action. Empirical studies show that individuals embedded in networks where corrupt behavior is normalized are more likely to engage in similar acts (Köbis, Iragorri-Carter, & Starke, 2018). This theory is particularly relevant in African societies, where kinship and patronage ties create strong obligations to assist one's in-group.

Public Choice Theory approaches corruption from an economic standpoint, portraying it as a rational outcome of self-interest under weak institutional constraints. Yet, critics argue it overlooks the cultural and moral dimensions that condition self-interest (Bertsch & Warner-Søderholm, 2013). Integrating cultural analysis

with public choice thus provides a fuller picture, showing how cultural norms influence the costs and perceived legitimacy of corrupt behavior.

This study adopts an interdisciplinary anthropological approach, combining these theories to interpret corruption as both a moral and social phenomenon shaped by Ghana's cultural environment.

3.3. Cross-Cultural Frameworks

To systematically analyze how culture shapes corruption, scholars have proposed several models of national culture.

Hofstede's (1980) Cultural Dimensions Theory identifies six axes: power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. African societies generally exhibit high power distance, reflecting hierarchical respect for elders and authority. Sub-Saharan Africa also tends toward collectivism due to extended family systems, which may foster loyalty networks conducive to favoritism or nepotism (**Blanca, Arnau, López-Montiel, Bono, & Bendayan, 2013**).

The GLOBE Project expanded Hofstede's framework by introducing nine dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, in-group and institutional collectivism, humane orientation, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, performance orientation, and future orientation. Studies have found links between GLOBE's cultural dimensions (especially uncertainty avoidance, in-group collectivism, and humane orientation) and levels of corruption (**Blanche, Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2006**). However, scholars such as **Hofstede (2001)** caution that the framework's national-level focus can obscure local variations within countries like Ghana.

Another influential model, Riggs' (Prismatic-Sala Model), conceptualizes developing societies as "prismatic"; combining modern and traditional systems with overlapping norms (**Boateng, Wang, Ntim, & Glaister, 2021; Khan, 2007**). This helps explain how Ghana's bureaucratic and customary structures interact, creating spaces where corruption thrives amid competing value systems.

While these models provide useful analytical lenses, they have limitations when applied to Ghana. Hofstede and GLOBE data only partially capture African contexts, as Ghana was not originally sampled. Hence, this study employs the GLOBE dimensions as a starting point but supplements them with local data to reveal Ghana-specific cultural traits influencing perceptions of corruption.

3.4. Relationship between Culture and Corruption

The relationship between culture and corruption is intricate, involving mutual reinforcement between social norms and institutional practices. Cultural values determine what societies perceive as moral or immoral, influencing not only the prevalence of corruption but also its acceptability (**Boateng & Adjorlolo, 2019; Kelly, 2014**).

In African contexts, collectivist orientations often emphasize loyalty to kin and

community over impersonal bureaucratic rules. This cultural logic creates an ethical tension between fulfilling communal obligations and adhering to legal norms. For instance, gift giving and reciprocity—hallmarks of African sociability—can transform into bribery when directed at public officials. The persistence of such practices demonstrates that corruption in Africa is not solely institutional failure but also reflects embedded social expectations.

Empirical studies reveal that societies with high power distance and collectivist cultures tend to exhibit higher tolerance for nepotism and favoritism. In Ghana, kin-based patronage networks shape political recruitment and administrative behavior, often overriding meritocratic standards. At the same time, moral codes rooted in communal ethics can also foster accountability, as traditional leaders and elders may sanction corrupt conduct when it threatens group cohesion.

Cultural heterogeneity within Ghana further complicates this relationship. While the Akan emphasize respect for authority and reciprocity, northern groups such as the Dagbani prioritize kin solidarity and customary honor systems. These variations imply that anti-corruption efforts must be culturally calibrated rather than uniform.

Scholars increasingly advocate integrating cultural understanding into governance reforms (Bokayev, Nauryzbek, Davletbayeva, Dussipov, Rysbekova, & Torebekova, 2023). Culturally sensitive anti-corruption strategies—such as engaging traditional authorities, leveraging communal sanctions, and aligning policies with indigenous moral codes—can enhance legitimacy and compliance (Braun & Clarke, 2023; Kelly, 2014). Conversely, neglecting cultural norms risks policy failure and resistance, as externally imposed reforms may clash with local moral economies.

The nexus between culture and corruption in Ghana reflects a dual reality: culture can simultaneously perpetuate and constrain corrupt practices. Understanding this interplay is essential for designing sustainable, culturally embedded anti-corruption frameworks that resonate with Ghanaian values and lived realities.

4. Research Methodology

The study adopted a sequential mixed-methods research design that integrated qualitative and quantitative phases to identify Ghana's dominant cultural dimensions using the GLOBE cultural framework and to examine how these dimensions shape perceptions of corruption. This design was selected because the phenomenon under investigation, culture and corruption, requires both exploratory depth and empirical validation. The qualitative phase enabled the discovery of context-specific corruption traits, while the quantitative phase allowed these traits to be tested against established cultural dimensions, ensuring methodological complementarity.

The research began with an exploratory qualitative component aimed at eliciting culturally grounded understandings of corruption and its manifestations in Ghana. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants drawn from

diverse sectors, including public service, academia, civil society, and the private sector. Purposive sampling ensured the selection of individuals who possessed practical exposure to governance systems and the socio-cultural dynamics that influence corruption. Data collection continued until thematic saturation was reached. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed using thematic analysis. Through iterative coding, five culturally salient corruption dimensions were identified: nepotism, favouritism, gift-taking, abuse of office, and informal exchange networks. These emergent themes served as the foundation for developing measurement items for the quantitative survey. To enhance content validity, the derived items were reviewed by experts familiar with Ghanaian cultural norms and anti-corruption discourse, and minor revisions were made to improve clarity and contextual accuracy.

Building on the qualitative findings, the quantitative phase sought to operationalize and test relationships between the GLOBE cultural dimensions and corruption perception at the national level. A structured questionnaire composed of three sections was developed. The first section measured the nine GLOBE societal culture dimensions using validated scales: uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, power distance, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, performance orientation, humane orientation, gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. The second section measured the five corruption traits identified in the qualitative phase. The final section captured demographic information, including age and political activity, which were later used to test moderation effects. All items were measured on a five-point Likert scale.

The survey was administered to 632 respondents from all sixteen regions of Ghana, using a combination of purposive and convenience sampling. This multistage sampling approach was justified given the study's exploratory and context-specific nature, which required participants with direct, varied insights into governance and culturally embedded perceptions of corruption characteristics not easily captured through random sampling. Convenience sampling enabled access to readily available respondents across diverse occupational groups, including public officials, teachers, students, private-sector workers, and informal-sector participants. Purposive sampling ensured the deliberate inclusion of individuals with relevant exposure to public-sector systems, institutional practices, and socio-cultural dynamics. Together, these methods allowed the researcher to efficiently reach a broad and occupationally diverse sample across all sixteen regions while maintaining focus on participants whose experiences and perspectives were most pertinent to understanding corruption perceptions in the Ghanaian context. This combination balanced practical accessibility with the targeted depth required for meaningful qualitative and contextual analysis. This approach was particularly useful in reaching participants embedded within informal networks, where issues related to corruption and cultural norms are often discussed and experienced.

However, it is acknowledged that non-probability sampling techniques limit the

generalizability of the findings, as the sample may not be fully representative of the entire Ghanaian population. The potential for selection bias cannot be entirely eliminated. Despite this limitation, the approach was deemed suitable for the study due to its emphasis on capturing depth, diversity, and contextually grounded insights rather than achieving statistical representativeness. Furthermore, the relatively large sample size ($N = 632$) enhances the robustness of the analysis and provides sufficient variability for structural equation modelling.

The sample size exceeded minimum thresholds recommended for Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), ensuring adequate statistical power for model estimation. Data screening procedures included checks for missing values, outliers, and normality. Ethical considerations were upheld by ensuring voluntary participation, anonymity, and informed consent.

Data analysis employed Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) using SmartPLS. This approach was appropriate because of its robustness in handling complex models, predictive orientation, and suitability for non-normal social science data. The analysis proceeded in two stages: assessment of the measurement model followed by evaluation of the structural model. Measurement model evaluation focused on indicator loadings, internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Composite reliability and Cronbach's alpha thresholds were met, while Average Variance Extracted values exceeded recommended minimums, demonstrating satisfactory construct validity.

Upon establishing measurement adequacy, the structural model was assessed to test hypothesized relationships between cultural dimensions and corruption perception. Path coefficients, t -statistics, and p -values were generated via bootstrapping (5000 resamples). The study tested nine direct hypotheses corresponding to the GLOBE dimensions and their expected influence on corruption perception. Four cultural dimensions, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, performance orientation, and power distance, showed statistically significant effects, while the remaining five did not. Model explanatory power was evaluated using R^2 values, and predictive relevance was examined through Q^2 statistics, both of which indicated moderate predictive validity. The study also examined whether age and political activity moderated the relationship between cultural dimensions and corruption perception. Interaction terms were created in SmartPLS, and moderation analysis revealed that both variables significantly conditioned the strength of certain cultural effects. Younger respondents and individuals with higher political engagement exhibited stronger associations between cultural traits and corruption perception, suggesting differential sensitivity to cultural cues based on experiential and political factors.

Finally, all results were interpreted in relation to Ghana's socio-cultural context. The methodological integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches ensured that culturally grounded insights were not only explored but rigorously tested. This comprehensive methodology provided a reliable basis for identifying culturally

dominant traits in Ghana and for understanding how these traits influence the way citizens perceive corruption across institutional and societal levels.

5. Data Analysis

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis carried out to identify Ghana's dominant cultural dimensions and to examine how these cultural characteristics influence perceptions of corruption. The analysis reflects the study's mixed-methods approach, beginning with qualitative findings from the interview phase and proceeding to the quantitative results from the national survey. The qualitative component provides culturally grounded insights into how corruption is understood and expressed within Ghanaian society, forming the basis for the development of the measurement items used in the quantitative phase.

The quantitative analysis, conducted using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM), evaluates both the measurement and structural models. This includes assessing the reliability and validity of the cultural and corruption constructs, testing the hypothesized relationships between the GLOBE cultural dimensions and corruption perception, and examining the moderating effects of age and political activity. Descriptive statistics, model estimates, and hypothesis-testing outcomes are presented and interpreted to provide a clear understanding of the patterns within the data.

5.2. Measurement Model Analysis

There are two main stages involved in structural equation modelling: the measurement model analysis and structural model analysis (Byrne, 2001).

This study's conceptual model is made up of national culture as second-order formative construct and its nine dimensions as first-order constructs with reflective indicators. Also, corruption was modelled as a second-order formative construct having five dimensions as first-order constructs with reflective indicators.

The measurement model, which describes the relationships between the latent variables (culture and perception of corruption) and their measures, was analysed using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) (SmartPLS: 4.0) (Byrne, 2001). The processes involve the assessment of the psychometric properties of the scales, which include convergent validity and discriminant validity.


The initial measurement test showed that some items under some of the reflective constructs had low (<0.50) loadings; therefore, in line with Byrne (2001), they were omitted, thus leaving only items with significant factor loadings in the model. The revised measurement model is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, while Table 1 provides details of the item loadings and bootstrap t-values.

5.3. Validated Cultural Dimensions

As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the validated dimensions of national culture


evident in Ghana can be viewed through nine distinct lenses: uncertainty avoidance, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, performance orientation, humane orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, power distance, and future orientation.

Among these dimensions, the most dominant cultural attribute among Ghanaians is future orientation ($\beta = 0.193$, $t = 24.530$, $p < 0.001$), followed by in-group collectivism ($\beta = 0.161$, $t = 21.611$, $p < 0.001$), uncertainty avoidance ($\beta = 0.156$, $t = 22.716$, $p < 0.001$), humane orientation ($\beta = 0.150$, $t = 18.118$, $p < 0.001$), assertiveness ($\beta = 0.147$, $t = 18.481$, $p < 0.001$), institutional collectivism ($\beta = 0.145$, $t = 22.173$, $p < 0.001$), power distance ($\beta = 0.142$, $t = 17.184$, $p = 0.001$), performance orientation ($\beta = 0.141$, $t = 18.117$, $p = 0.001$), and gender egalitarianism ($\beta = 0.105$, $t = 12.80$, $p < 0.001$). **Table 1** presents a detailed analysis of individual cultural dimensions and their respective measurement items.



Source: Field data (2025).

Figure 1. Measurement model analysis of the path diagram—path coefficients.



Source: Field data (2025).

Figure 2. Measurement model analysis of the path diagram—t-values.

Table 1. Construct and item loading.

Construct	Code	Loading
Uncertainty Avoidance	UA1	0.679
	UA3	0.809
	UA4	0.727
Assertiveness	ASS2	0.772
	ASS3	0.756
	ASS4	0.674

Continued

	GE2	0.638
Gender Egalitarianism	GE3	0.611
	GE4	0.757
	PO1	0.763
Performance Orientation	PO2	0.713
	PO3	0.744
	HO1	0.796
Humane Orientation	HO3	0.836
	HO5	0.639
	IGC1	0.826
In-Group Collectivism	IGC2	0.817
	IGC3	0.545
	IC1	0.648
Institutional Collectivism	IC3	0.814
	IC4	0.716
	PD2	0.72
Power Distance	PD3	0.726
	PD4	0.794
	FO1	0.845
Future Orientation	FO2	0.781
	FO3	0.814
	PBBC2	0.645
Public Betrayal Based Corruption	PBBC3	0.701
	PBBC4	0.741
	PBBC5	0.711
	PBBC6	0.761
	IBC1	0.722
Inducement Based Corruption	IBC2	0.746
	IBC3	0.777
	IBC4	0.759

Continued

	APBC1	0.77
Abuse of Power Based Corruption	APBC2	0.772
	APBC4	0.805
	PRVBC1	0.698
Public Rule Violation Based Corruption	PRVBC2	0.779
	PRVBC4	0.719
	UBC1	0.89
Unethical Based Corruption	UBC2	0.634

All the t-values are significant at p .

The most dominant cultural dimension identified in this study is future orientation. This dimension is strongly represented by the indicators “plan ahead” (FO1; loading = 0.845) (FO1), “planned well in advance” (FO3; loading = 0.814), and “plan for the future” (FO2; loading = 0.781). The approximate mean value of 3 suggests that individuals in Ghanaian society generally prioritize future planning and long-term perspectives.

In-group collectivism, the second most prevalent cultural dimension in Ghana, is evidenced by several key indicators. “Children taking pride in the individual accomplishments of their parents” (IDC1; loading = 0.826), “parents taking pride in the individual accomplishments of their children” (IDC2; loading = 0.817), and “being accepted by other members of a group” (IDC3; loading = 0.545). These indicators, with an approximate mean value of 3, reflect the degree to which individuals in Ghanaian society express pride, loyalty, and interdependence within their families and group members.

Uncertainty avoidance, the third most recognized cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “requirements and instructions being spelled out in detail so that citizens know what they should do” (UA3; loading = 0.809), “the society having rules or laws to cover” (UA4; loading = 0.727), and “orderliness and consistency being stressed, even at the expense of experimentation and innovation” (UA1; loading = 0.679). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the extent to which individuals in Ghanaian society endorse practices within the societal framework to avoid uncertainty, often at the expense of experimentation and in favour of strict rules and strong legislation.

Humane orientation, the fourth most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “people generally being very friendly” (HO; loading = 0.836), “people being generally concerned about others” (HO1; loading = 0.796), and “people being generally generous” (HO5; loading = 0.639). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the extent to which individuals in Ghanaian society generally accept practices of showing support for human beings, including caring, generosity, concern, and friendliness toward others.

Assertiveness, the fifth most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “people generally being assertive” (ASS2; loading = 0.772), “people generally being dominant” (ASS3; loading = 0.756), and “people generally being tough” (ASS4; loading = 0.638). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the degree to which individuals in Ghanaian society are encouraged to be tough, dominant, and assertive.

Institutional collectivism, the sixth most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “the importance of individuals in the group being accepted by other members of a group” (IC3; loading = 0.814), “the value of group cohesion as against individualism” (IC4; loading = 0.716), and “leaders of the society encouraging group loyalty even if individual goals suffer” (IC1; loading = 0.648). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the extent to which Ghanaian society generally encourages and rewards collective action.

Power distance, the seventh most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “the special privileges one is entitled to due to rank and position in the hierarchy” (PD4; loading = 0.794), “people in positions of power increasing their distance from the less powerful individuals rather than decreasing it” (PD; loading = 0.726), and “followers obeying their leaders without questioning” (PD2; loading = 0.720). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the extent to which Ghanaian society generally accepts and endorses authority, power differences, and status privileges.

Performance orientation, the eighth most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “society’s encouragement of teenage students to strive for continuously improved performance” (PO1; loading = 0.763), “the extent of reward for being innovative to improve performance” (PO3; loading = 0.744), and “the factors on which society’s major rewards are based, with a preference for performance effectiveness” (PO2; loading = 0.713). The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the degree to which Ghanaian society generally encourages and rewards individuals and groups for high performance.

Gender egalitarianism, the ninth most endorsed cultural dimension among Ghanaians, is explained by “how physical people generally are in the society” (GE4; loading = 0.757), “the level of emphasis laid on athletic programs for boys as against girls” (GE2; loading = 0.638) with a factor loading of 0.638, and “how much worse it is for boys to fail in school as against girls” (GE3; loading = 0.611).

The approximate mean value of 3 reflects the extent to which role differences between genders are generally maximized in Ghanaian society. These dimensions collectively contribute to a societal framework that values planning for the future, strong community bonds, stability, compassion, and assertiveness, which are essential for navigating the complexities of Ghanaian life.

5.4. Descriptive Statistics of the Construct Items

National Culture

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the measured dimensions of the culture

construct. The mean values of the dimensions range between 3.437 (± 1.297) and 2.809 (± 1.323), indicating that all the cultural dimensions were accepted by the respondents, as the mean scores were below the neutral point (4). This suggests a general endorsement of the cultural dimensions among the respondents. The results imply that the nine validated cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, performance orientation, humane orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, power distance, and future orientation) are perceived as traits of the cultural landscape in Ghana. The acceptance of these dimensions reflects their relevance and integration into the societal fabric.

Additionally, the lower standard deviation value of approximately 1.3 across all nine cultural dimensions indicates a high level of consistency in the respondents' answers. This consistency suggests that the mean values are a reliable representation of the respondents' perceptions and accurately reflect the cultural traits in Ghana. The standard deviation values reinforce the validity of the data, implying that the cultural dimensions are uniformly perceived by the participants. Overall, the descriptive statistics underscore the significance of these cultural dimensions in Ghanaian society, highlighting their role in shaping social norms and behaviours. The consistency in responses further validates the robustness of the measurement model analysis, confirming that the identified cultural dimensions are integral to understanding the cultural context of Ghana.

5.5. Corruption

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the measured dimensions of the corruption construct. The mean values for the dimensions range between 2.482 (± 1.270) and 2.315 (± 1.200), indicating that all the dimensions of corruption were acknowledged by the respondents, as the mean scores were below the neutral point (4). This suggests a consensus among respondents on the existence and relevance of these corruption dimensions in Ghana. The results indicate that the validated dimensions of corruption, as identified during the measurement model analysis, include public betrayal-based corruption, inducement-based corruption, abuse of power-based corruption, public rule-violation-based corruption, and unethical-based corruption. These forms of corruption are recognized as significant and prevalent issues within the Ghanaian context. Furthermore, the relatively low standard deviation values, approximately 1.2 across all five corruption dimensions, suggest a high level of consistency in the respondents' answers. This consistency implies that the mean values are a reliable reflection of the respondents' perceptions, indicating that these corruption dimensions are uniformly perceived by the participants. The findings highlight the critical aspects of corruption in Ghana, emphasizing the multifaceted nature of corrupt practices as understood by the respondents. The consistency in responses reinforces the robustness of the measurement model, confirming that the identified dimensions provide an accurate and comprehensive representation of corruption in Ghana. Overall, the descriptive statistics underscore the importance of addressing these specific forms of corruption, as they are widely recognized and agreed upon by the respondents. This agreement

highlights the need for targeted interventions and policies to mitigate these corruption dimensions and promote integrity within Ghanaian society.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.
National Culture				
Uncertainty Avoidance	1.000	6.670	3.054	1.284
Assertiveness	1.000	6.670	3.308	1.356
Gender Egalitarianism	1.000	7.000	3.175	1.340
Performance Orientation	1.000	7.000	3.437	1.297
Humane Orientation	1.000	7.000	3.269	1.469
In-Group Collectivism	1.000	7.000	2.809	1.323
Institutional Collectivism	1.000	7.000	3.105	1.274
Power Distance	1.000	6.670	3.064	1.399
Future Orientation	1.000	7.000	2.999	1.534
Corruption				
Public Betrayal Based Corruption	1.000	6.600	2.345	1.178
Inducement Based Corruption	1.000	7.000	2.315	1.200
Abuse of Power Based Corruption	1.000	8.000	2.420	1.326
Public Rule Violation Based Corruption	1.000	6.670	2.482	1.270
Unethical Based Corruption	1.000	7.000	2.352	1.237

Source: Field data (2025).

Construct Normality Test

In this section, normality test was conducted. The purpose of the normality test is to determine the appropriate data analysis procedure to use to test the conceptual model, as shown in **Table 3**. All the constructs had skewness and kurtosis within the recommended cut-off point of -1.5 and 1.6 for skewness, and less than 2.7 for kurtosis in accordance with [Blanca et al. \(2013\)](#), however, a more rigorous test using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and Shapiro-Wilk test in accordance with [Byrne \(2001\)](#) showed that all the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test values were statistically significant, thus showing significant nonnormality of data distribution. According to [Hair et al. \(2017\)](#), the distribution of data has no effect on partial least squares structural equation modelling. Alternative techniques include OLS regression and covariance-based SEM methods (AMOS and LISREL, MPLUS), but these methods require multivariate normality of the residuals of the dependent variables or very large sample sizes to be used.

Table 3. Normality diagnostics of latent variables.

Constructs	Skewness	Kurtosis	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	<i>p</i>	Shapiro-Wilk	<i>p</i>
National Culture						
Uncertainty Avoidance	0.278	−0.434	0.079	0.00***	0.971	0.00***
Assertiveness	0.142	−0.628	0.069	0.00***	0.976	0.00***
Gender Egalitarianism	0.212	−0.487	0.067	0.00***	0.972	0.00***
Performance Orientation	0.211	−0.345	0.075	0.00***	0.983	0.00***
Humane Orientation	0.318	−0.663	0.09	0.00***	0.967	0.00***
In-Group Collectivism	0.345	−0.533	0.097	0.00***	0.952	0.00***
Institutional Collectivism	0.228	−0.413	0.079	0.00***	0.974	0.00***
Power Distance	0.371	−0.539	0.087	0.00***	0.962	0.00***
Future Orientation	0.383	−0.863	0.1	0.00***	0.941	0.00***
Corruption						
Public Betrayal Based Corruption	0.923	0.394	0.131	0.00***	0.912	0.00***
Inducement Based Corruption	1.028	0.783	0.137	0.00***	0.9	0.00***
Abuse of Power Based Corruption	0.944	0.286	0.151	0.00***	0.894	0.00***
Public Rule Violation Based Corruption	0.878	0.243	0.142	0.00***	0.914	0.00***
Unethical Based Corruption	0.98	0.604	0.175	0.00***	0.891	0.00***

****p* < 0.001. Source: Field data (2025).

5.6. Correlation Matrix

Using Pearson bivariate correlations, this section evaluates the relationships that exist between the variables in the research model without controlling for each other. As shown in **Table 4**, all the inter-construct correlations were all positive and significant with the exception of the relationship between performance orientation and inducement-based corruption and that of abuse of power-based corruption. Furthermore, all of the relationships between the constructs were low to moderate with the highest correlation being 0.72, which is the correlation between public betrayal-based corruption and inducement-based and between public betrayal-based corruption and abuse of power-based corruption. Therefore, there is no multicollinearity problem.

5.7. Assessment of Structural Model

To test the hypothesis of the study, a structural model was formulated in line with the study's conceptual model. The national culture construct was computed using the latent scores derived from the nine dimensions of national culture, including uncertainty avoidance, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, performance orienta-

tion, humane orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, power distance, and future orientation.

Table 4. Correlation matrix.

Constructs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Uncertainty Avoidance	1.00													
Assertiveness	0.57**	1.00												
Gender Egalitarianism	0.34**	0.38**	1.00											
Performance Orientation	0.67**	0.47**	0.27**	1.00										
Humane Orientation	0.50**	0.55**	0.33**	0.43**	1.00									
In-Group Collectivism	0.51**	0.49**	0.43**	0.49**	0.42**	1.00								
Institutional Collectivism	0.51**	0.51**	0.43**	0.47**	0.41**	0.46**	1.00							
Power Distance	0.43**	0.41**	0.43**	0.42**	0.32**	0.52**	0.45**	1.00						
Future Orientation	0.60**	0.55**	0.33**	0.59**	0.50**	0.54**	0.54**	0.42**	1.00					
Public Betrayal Based Corruption	0.11**	0.13**	0.21**	0.08*	0.16**	0.25**	0.21**	0.21**	0.14**	1.00				
Inducement Based Corruption	0.14**	0.16**	0.27**	0.02*	0.17**	0.29**	0.21**	0.24**	0.18**	0.72**	1.00			
Abuse of Power Based Corruption	0.14**	0.15**	0.24**	0.06*	0.16**	0.26**	0.18**	0.27**	0.18**	0.72**	0.68**	1.00		
Public Rule Violation Based Corruption	0.17**	0.17**	0.24**	0.12**	0.19**	0.25**	0.19**	0.25**	0.23**	0.61**	0.60**	0.61**	1.00	
Unethical Based Corruption	0.09*	0.06*	0.34**	0.09*	0.09*	0.31**	0.17**	0.24**	0.11**	0.29**	0.30**	0.34**	0.32**	1.00

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (two-tail test). Source: Field data (2021).

Also, corruption construct was computed using the latent scores derived from the five antecedents of corruption, including public betrayal-based corruption, inducement-based corruption, abuse of power-based corruption, public rule violation-based corruption, and unethical-based corruption. The gender variable was converted into dummy where 0 = female and 1 = Male. The relationship between the latent constructs in the model is explained by the inner or structural model (Byrne, 2001). It is therefore necessary to assess the structural model for the importance of the inner paths after assessing the measurement model. Consequently, a structural model was formulated by examining the effect of national culture on corruption and moderated by demographic and social variables such as gender, age, education, income, family size, tenure of service, and political activeness. The structural models showing both regression weights and t-values are presented below in **Figure 3** and **Figure 4** respectively.

Hypothesis Testing


To find answers to the third objective of the study, eight hypotheses were formulated in line with the study's conceptual model:

H1: The cultural practices of Ghanaians influence their perception of corruption.

H2a: Gender moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among males than females.


H2b: Age moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among older Ghanaians than younger ones.

H2c: Active party politics participation moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among Ghanaians engaged in active politics than those who are not.



Source: Field data (2025).

Figure 3. Structural model showing regression weights.



Source: Field data (2025).

Figure 4. Structural model showing t-values.

H2d: Income level moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger on Ghanaians with lower income levels than those with higher income levels.

H2e: Family size moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger on Ghanaians with large family size than those with smaller family size.

H2f: Level of education moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger on Ghanaians with higher education than those with lower education.

H2g: Number of years served in office moderates the effect of culture on Ghanaian perception of corruption.

5.8. Hypothesis Test Results

Following the outcome of the structural model test, the results of the hypotheses have been summarized as shown in **Table 5** below. The specific hypotheses test results are explained as follows: H1: The cultural practices of Ghanaians influence their perception of corruption. The analysis revealed a significant positive relationship between national culture and citizens' perceptions of corruption ($\beta = 0.203$, $t = 2.992$, $p = 0.003$). This indicates that national culture positively influences Ghanaian perceptions of corruption, suggesting that elements of typical Ghanaian culture play a substantial role in shaping these perceptions. Consequently, Hypothesis H1 is supported in this context.

H2a: Gender moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among males than females.

The interaction between gender and national culture did not exhibit a significant influence on the perception of corruption ($\beta = -0.009$, $t = 0.114$, $p = 0.909$). This indicates that gender does not significantly interact with national culture in shaping individual perceptions of corruption. Consequently, hypothesis H2a is not supported in this context.

H2b: Age moderates the effect of culture on Ghanaian perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among older Ghanaians than younger ones.

The interaction between age and national culture significantly influences Ghanaians' perception of corruption ($\beta = 0.096$, $t = 2.004$, $p < 0.05$). This finding supports hypothesis H2b, indicating that the effect of national culture on perceptions of corruption is stronger among older Ghanaians compared to younger ones. Specifically, older Ghanaians (age above 40 years) exhibit a stronger perception of corruption than their younger counterparts (age below 40 years).

Figure 5 illustrates the positive moderation effect of age on the relationship between national culture and corruption perception. The graph shows that the lines for the two age groups intersect, providing evidence of moderation. The positive moderation is evident as the perception of corruption among older Ghanaians (represented by the dotted line) increases, while that among younger Ghanaians (represented by the solid line) decreases. This intersection highlights the differ-

tial impact of national culture on corruption perception across different age groups, emphasizing the stronger influence on older adults.

Table 5. Structural paths showing hypothesis test results.

Hypothesis	Structural Path	Path Coefficient	t-value	p	Hypothesis Results
H1	National Culture -> Corruption	0.203	2.992	0.003**	Supported
H2a	Gender × National Culture -> Corruption	−0.009	0.114	0.909	Not Supported
H32b	Age × National Culture -> Corruption	0.096	2.004	0.045*	Supported
H4c	Politically Active × National Culture -> Corruption	0.283	3.289	0.001**	Supported
	Age -> Corruption	−0.038	0.874	0.382	
	Education -> Corruption	−0.096	2.31	0.021*	
	Family Size -> Corruption	0.105	2.453	0.014*	
	Gender -> Corruption	0.053	0.717	0.473	
	Income -> Corruption	0.083	1.696	0.09	
	Politically Active -> Corruption	−0.05	0.611	0.541	
	Tenure of Service -> Corruption	−0.13	2.654	0.008**	
H5d	Income × National Culture -> Corruption	0.067	1.17	0.242	Not Supported
H6e	Family Size × National Culture -> Corruption	0.014	0.31	0.757	Not Supported
H7f	Education × National Culture -> Corruption	−0.036	0.765	0.444	Not Supported
H8g	Tenure of Service × National Culture -> Corruption	−0.078	1.463	0.144	Not Supported

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Source: Field data (2025).




Figure 5. Moderation slope showing a positive moderation effect of age on national culture and perception of corruption.

H2c: Active party politics participation moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger among Ghanaians engaged in active politics than those who are not.

The analysis demonstrates a significant positive interaction effect between active political participation and national culture on perceptions of corruption ($\beta = 0.283$, $t = 3.289$, $p = 0.001$). Therefore, hypothesis H2c is supported within this context. This finding indicates that the influence of national culture on perceptions of corruption is more pronounced among Ghanaians who are actively involved in politics than among those who are not.

The moderation slope illustrated in **Figure 6** further explains this positive moderating effect. As shown in **Figure 6**, the lines representing Ghanaians engaged in active politics (dotted line) and those not engaged (solid line) intersect, providing visual evidence of moderation. The positive moderation is evident as the perceptions of corruption among politically active Ghanaians increase, while those among non-politically active Ghanaians decrease.




Figure 6. Moderation slope showing a positive moderation effect of active politics participation on national culture and perception of corruption.

H2d: Income level moderates the effect of culture on perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger on Ghanaians with lower income levels than those with higher income levels. The analysis indicated that the interaction between income level and national culture was not found to have a significant impact on the perception of corruption ($\beta = -0.067$, $t = 1.170$, $p = 0.242$). This indicates that income level does not significantly interact with national culture in shaping individuals' perceptions of corruption. Consequently, hypothesis H2d is not supported within the context of this study.

H2e: Family size moderates the effect of culture on Ghanaian perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger on Ghanaians with large family size than those with smaller family size. The analysis of the interaction between family size

and national culture on the perception of corruption yielded a non-significant effect ($\beta = -0.014$, $t = 0.310$, $p = 0.757$). These results indicate that family size does not significantly moderate the relationship between national culture and perceptions of corruption in the Ghanaian context. Consequently, Hypothesis H2e is not supported by the data.

H2f: Level of education moderates the effect of culture on Ghanaian perception of corruption such that the effect is stronger with Ghanaians with higher level of education than those with lower level of education.

The analysis revealed that the interaction between the level of education and national culture did not have a significant effect on Ghanaian perceptions of corruption ($\beta = -0.036$, $t = 0.765$, $p = 0.444$). This indicates that education does not interact with culture to influence the perception of corruption among Ghanaians. Therefore, Hypothesis H2f is not supported.

H2g: Number of years served in office moderates the effect of culture on Ghanaian perception of corruption.

The analysis revealed that the interaction between number of years served in office and national culture did not have a significant effect on Ghanaian perceptions of corruption ($\beta = -0.078$, $t = 1.463$, $p = 0.144$). This indicates that number of years served in office does not interact with culture to influence the perception of corruption among Ghanaians. Therefore, Hypothesis H2g is not supported.

5.9. Examining the Effect of Individual Cultural Dimension on Perception of Corruption

To determine which dimensions of national culture significantly influence the Ghanaian perception of corruption, we re-examined the structural model with the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM). The results of this analysis are presented as shown in **Figure 7** and **Figure 8** and summarized in **Table 6** below. The analysis revealed several significant determinants of the perception of corruption. In-group collectivism ($\beta = 0.220$, $t = 3.868$, $p = 0.000$), gender egalitarianism ($\beta = 0.162$, $t = 3.332$, $p = 0.001$), and power distance ($\beta = 0.138$, $t = 2.986$, $p = 0.003$) were found to be positive and statistically significant in explaining the perception of corruption in Ghanaian context. Conversely, performance orientation significantly reduced the perception of corruption ($\beta = -0.178$, $t = 3.142$, $p = 0.002$). These results provide empirical support for hypotheses H1f, H1c, H1h, and H1d. However, the remaining five dimensions which include uncertainty avoidance ($\beta = -0.026$, $t = 0.465$, $p = 0.642$), humane orientation ($\beta = 0.037$, $t = 0.752$, $p = 0.452$), institutional collectivism ($\beta = 0.084$, $t = 1.611$, $p = 0.107$), assertiveness ($\beta = -0.070$, $t = 1.358$, $p = 0.175$), and future orientation ($\beta = 0.064$, $t = 1.271$, $p = 0.204$) were statistically not significant in explaining the perception of corruption within the Ghanaian context. Therefore, the hypotheses related to these dimensions (H1a, H1b, H1e, H1h, and H1g) were not supported. Ghanaian culture can therefore be examined through the lens of all nine GLOBE cultural dimensions; however, only four of these dimensions (in-group collectivism, gender




Figure 7. Determinants of perception of corruption—regression weights.




Figure 8. Determinants of perception of corruption—t-values.


Table 6. Mean, STDEV, t-values, *p*-values (determinants of corruption).

Paths	Original Sample (O)	Sample Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (STDEV)	t-statistics (O/STDEV)	<i>p</i> -values
Assertiveness -> Corruption	-0.07	-0.068	0.051	1.358	0.175
Future_Orientation -> Corruption	0.064	0.064	0.05	1.271	0.204
Gender_Egalitarianism -> Corruption	0.162	0.164	0.049	3.332	0.001
Humane_Orientation -> Corruption	0.037	0.036	0.049	0.752	0.452
InGroup_Collectivism -> Corruption	0.22	0.218	0.057	3.868	0.000
Institutional_Collectivism -> Corruption	0.084	0.083	0.052	1.611	0.107
Performance_Orientation -> Corruption	-0.178	-0.178	0.057	3.142	0.002
Power_Distance -> Corruption	0.138	0.136	0.046	2.986	0.003
Uncertainty_Avoidance -> Corruption	-0.026	-0.026	0.056	0.465	0.642

Source: Field data (2022).

egalitarianism, power distance, and performance orientation) significantly influence the level of corruption perception among Ghanaians. The remaining five dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, assertiveness, and future orientation) do not significantly contribute to the perception of corruption within the Ghanaian context.

Consequently, the structural model of the study findings was respecified by removing non-significant paths and the revised model is presented in **Figure 9** below.



Source: Author's fieldwork (2022).

Figure 9. Conceptual model of culture & corruption.

6. Discussion

6.1. Overview of Key Findings

This study examined how Ghana's dominant cultural dimensions shape citizens' perceptions of corruption using the GLOBE cultural framework. The findings confirm that corruption perception is significantly influenced by cultural values, sup-

porting the argument that corruption is not merely a governance failure but also a socially constructed phenomenon embedded in cultural norms (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010). Specifically, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, power distance, and performance orientation emerged as key determinants of how corruption is interpreted within the Ghanaian context. Additionally, demographic factors such as age and political participation moderated these relationships, indicating that cultural effects on corruption perception vary across social groups.

6.2. Cultural Dimensions and Corruption Perception

The significant influence of in-group collectivism aligns with prior studies, which suggest that collectivist societies tend to prioritize loyalty to family and close social networks over impersonal institutional rules (Cassell & Bishop, 2019). In the Ghanaian context, where extended family systems and communal ties are deeply entrenched, individuals may view practices such as nepotism and favouritism as socially acceptable obligations rather than corrupt acts (Chen & Ganapati, 2023). This supports the argument that corruption is often normalized within relational networks where social expectations override formal ethical standards (Chen & Ganapati, 2023; Chua, Roth, & Lemoine, 2015).

The positive relationship between power distance and corruption perception is also consistent with existing literature. High power distance cultures tend to accept hierarchical authority and unequal distribution of power, which can create environments where abuse of office is less likely to be questioned (Hofstede, 2001; Clark, 2017). In Ghana, respect for authority and traditional leadership structures may reinforce acceptance of privilege and discretionary power, thereby shaping how corruption is perceived (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012).

Conversely, performance orientation was found to significantly reduce corruption perception, supporting studies that link merit-based systems with lower tolerance for corrupt practices. When societal rewards are based on achievement and competence rather than relational ties, the justification for corrupt behaviour is weakened. Similarly, the positive influence of gender egalitarianism aligns with findings that more inclusive and equitable societies tend to exhibit stronger ethical norms and lower tolerance for corruption (Darley, Luethge, & Blankson, 2013; Das, 2022).

6.3. In-Group versus Institutional Collectivism

A key contribution of this study is the contrasting finding between in-group collectivism and institutional collectivism. While in-group collectivism significantly influenced corruption perception, institutional collectivism did not. This distinction is consistent with the argument that collectivism operates differently at interpersonal and institutional levels (DiRienzo, 2019).

In-group collectivism reflects strong loyalty to family and close networks, which are central to Ghanaian social organization. As noted in previous studies, such relational obligations often encourage practices like favouritism and patronage, which

may be culturally justified despite conflicting with formal rules (Duri, 2021). This explains why in-group collectivism has a significant effect on corruption perception, as individuals are more likely to interpret actions through the lens of social obligation rather than legal standards.

In contrast, institutional collectivism refers to the extent to which formal systems promote collective action and shared responsibility. The non-significant effect observed in this study suggests that formal institutions in Ghana may not strongly shape individuals' interpretations of corruption. This finding aligns with studies that highlight weak institutional trust and limited enforcement capacity in many African contexts, where informal networks often take precedence over formal governance structures (Esarey & Dalton, 2023). As a result, corruption perception is more strongly influenced by interpersonal relationships than by institutional norms.

6.4. Moderating Effects of Demographic Factors

The moderating role of age and political participation further enriches the analysis. The finding that age strengthens the relationship between culture and corruption perception is consistent with research suggesting that older individuals are more deeply socialized into prevailing cultural norms and therefore more likely to interpret corruption through culturally embedded frameworks (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019).

Similarly, the significant moderating effect of political participation supports studies indicating that individuals who are actively engaged in political processes are more exposed to institutional dynamics and are therefore more sensitive to cultural influences on governance practices (Fazekas, Poltoratskaia, & Tóth, 2023). This suggests that political engagement amplifies the extent to which cultural values shape perceptions of corruption.

7. Summary and Conclusion

This study provides a comprehensive picture of corruption in Ghana from a cultural perspective. Qualitative evidence showed that Ghanaians define corruption largely as the exploitation of public roles for private benefit, spanning a wide array of forms (bribery, extortion, nepotism, etc.). Cultural nuances emerged, notably the blurred line between traditional gift-giving and illicit bribery, and the central role of social networks and kinship in facilitating corrupt acts. Participants overwhelmingly viewed corruption as detrimental breeding inequality, stalling development, and undermining community values though a few perceived it as a pragmatic workaround for bureaucratic hurdles.

Quantitatively, the research validated a culturally grounded corruption scale that categorizes corrupt behavior into five dimensions: public betrayal-based, inducement-based, abuse-of-power-based, public-rule-violation-based, and unethical secrecy-based corruption. Among these, public betrayal-based corruption (misuse of public office for personal or close-circle gain) was found to be most prev-

alent. The analysis of cultural traits revealed that Ghanaian society emphasizes long-term planning (future orientation) and strong family/community ties (in-group collectivism). Other dimensions, such as moderate uncertainty avoidance and humane orientation, were observed, whereas institutional collectivism, power distance, performance orientation, and gender egalitarianism were less pronounced.

Critically, the study demonstrated that culture significantly influences corruption perceptions. Higher in-group collectivism, greater acceptance of power hierarchies, and stronger commitment to gender equality were each linked to variations in how corruption is viewed, while a stronger performance orientation correlated with reduced tolerance for corrupt behavior. The fact that age and political engagement amplify these cultural effects underscores the depth of cultural imprint on corruption attitudes.

8. Recommendations

The recommendations of this study are grounded in the empirical findings, particularly the significant relationships identified between specific cultural dimensions and corruption perception.

First, the finding that performance orientation is negatively associated with corruption perception ($\beta = -0.178$, $p < 0.01$) suggests that promoting merit-based systems can play a critical role in reducing corruption. Therefore, it is recommended that policymakers strengthen performance-based recruitment, promotion, and reward systems within public institutions. By prioritizing competence, efficiency, and measurable outcomes over personal relationships, such systems can reduce the influence of favoritism and nepotism, thereby weakening culturally embedded justifications for corrupt practices.

Second, the study found that in-group collectivism is positively associated with corruption perception ($\beta = 0.220$, $p < 0.001$), indicating that strong loyalty to family and close social networks contributes to the normalization of practices such as favoritism and patronage. In response, it is recommended that anti-corruption policies incorporate ethical reorientation programmes that address the tension between communal obligations and professional responsibilities. Public education campaigns and institutional codes of conduct should emphasize the distinction between social support and abuse of public office, thereby helping to reshape normative expectations within collectivist settings.

Third, the positive relationship between power distance and corruption perception ($\beta = 0.138$, $p < 0.01$) highlights the role of hierarchical structures in reinforcing acceptance of authority-based privilege. To address this, it is recommended that governance reforms focus on strengthening accountability mechanisms, including transparent decision-making processes, whistleblowing systems, and citizen oversight. Reducing excessive power concentration and encouraging participatory governance can help challenge unquestioned authority and limit opportunities for abuse of power.

Fourth, the finding that gender egalitarianism is positively associated with reduced tolerance for corruption ($\beta = 0.162$, $p < 0.01$) suggests that more inclusive and equitable social systems may foster stronger ethical standards. Accordingly, policies aimed at promoting gender inclusion and equal participation in leadership positions should be strengthened. Increasing female representation in governance and decision-making structures may contribute to enhancing integrity and reducing corruption tolerance within institutions.

Fifth, the moderating effects of age ($\beta = 0.096$, $p < 0.05$) and political participation ($\beta = 0.283$, $p < 0.01$) indicate that cultural influences on corruption perception vary across demographic groups. This suggests the need for targeted interventions. Anti-corruption strategies should be tailored to different population segments, with particular emphasis on engaging younger individuals and politically active citizens through civic education, transparency initiatives, and participatory governance programmes.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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